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The Recording Industry v. James Madison, aka 
“Publius”: The Inversion of Culture and Copyright 
Liam Séamus O’Melinn∗ 
I. COPYRIGHT BEFORE CULTURE: THE RECORDING INDUSTRY V.  
JAMES MADISON, AKA “PUBLIUS” 
In midsummer, the recording industry stunned the nation by an-
nouncing its intention to file suit against the estate of Founding Father 
and former President James Madison. An industry spokesman declared 
that Madison would be sued for plagiarism and copyright infringement 
and that the industry would ask for injunctive relief as well as statutory 
damages: 
We are bringing this suit in order to show people that even those 
who placed the intellectual property clause in the Constitution are 
not immune to its strictures. Most people who revere the Founding 
Fathers do not realize just how dishonest they really were. We will 
not allow a Pirate to hide behind the mantle of President, and we 
know only too well how to expose the identities of pirates who seek 
the shield of anonymity. ‘Publius’ will be treated no differently. 
In response to a question about whether Madison’s intimate connection 
with the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution should afford 
him a special place in understanding the purpose and extent of the copy-
right power, the spokesman replied, “The true father of American copy-
right is an English philosopher named John Locke, who understood so 
much better than our own Founders what the purpose of American copy-
right was.” 
He further indicated that two more defendants would be named: 
Madison’s alma mater, Princeton University, because the university had 
“for more than 250 years ignored its obligation to teach its students that 
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there is a fundamental norm against unauthorized copying and that copy-
right protection is a right recognized by both common and natural law.” 
Additionally, Benjamin Franklin would be named on the basis of his un-
authorized transmission and publication of a series of private letters.  
Would James Madison, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson 
have downloaded copyrighted works if they had the technological means 
to do so? That is one of the questions presented by the recording indus-
try’s seemingly fanciful suit, a suit that presents an unusual opportunity 
to compare the ethos of copyright at the time of the Founding Fathers 
with copyright in the present day. To put the issue differently, does the 
vision of copyright currently espoused by the music and movie industries 
represent a fundamental departure from the traditional contours of copy-
right law? 
This question could hardly be more timely. On March 7, 2011, the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear Golan v. Holder, a case involving 
the constitutionality of section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act, which granted copyright to foreign works already in the public do-
main in the United States.1 Golan invites the Court to reconsider its ad-
monition in Eldred v. Ashcroft that congressional copyright legislation 
that departed from the “traditional contours of copyright” should be ad-
judicated under a high level of scrutiny.2 The Court has proclaimed the 
importance of tradition in other recent cases as well. For example, in 
eBay v. MercExchange, a case holding that injunctions should not issue 
as a matter of course in patent infringement actions, the Court called at-
tention to the importance of history.3 Justice Thomas’s majority opinion 
asserted that there was a well-settled course of equity practice governing 
injunctive relief in patent suits going back to the time of the nation’s 
founding,4 and Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence insisted that “a page 
of history is worth a volume of logic.”5 
Moreover, history has once again become a subject of central con-
cern to intellectual property scholars. Both Adam Mossoff and Justin 
Hughes seek to develop a richer historical context in which to situate the 
origin of intellectual property law.6 Both Hughes and Mossoff challenge 
                                                 
 1. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011). 
 2. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). In Eldred, the Court applied rational basis 
scrutiny in upholding the Copyright Term Extension Act. Id. at 204. 
 3. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 4. Id. at 391–92. 
 5. Id. at 395. 
 6. More specifically, Adam Mossoff delves into the origins of patent law. See Adam Mossoff, 
Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in 
Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007) [hereinafter Mossoff, Who Cares]. Justin 
Hughes, while not exclusively focused on the origins of copyright and patent, explores the question 
of whether intellectual property was conceived as property in the early republic and assesses promi-
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the shared wisdom of scholars on the character of intellectual property 
law in the early republic on two points in particular: first, that the inspira-
tion for the law was purely utilitarian rather than rights-based, and 
second, that copyright and patent were not thought of as property in the 
early years. Thus, both argue a different theory of the rationale behind 
the creation of patents and patent law, and both authors call for further 
investigation into the history of the law. Their studies indicate a renewal 
of scholarly interest the history of copyright and patent. 
The expansion of copyright, with regard both to the subject matter 
that is eligible for protection and the degree of protection offered, is also 
a subject of current scholarly interest. Copyright was originally unavaila-
ble for musical compositions or photographs, and scholars have detailed 
the processes by which copyright was extended to music7 and photos.8 
There is also a burgeoning literature on the relationship between creativi-
ty and copyright in music and art, much of which focuses on borrowing 
and remixing issues.9 
                                                                                                             
nent early Americans’ attitudes toward copyright and patent. See Justin Hughes, Copyright and 
Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 
993 (2006). For an analysis of Locke’s 1694 memorandum on the proposed renewal of licensing, see 
Justin Hughes, Locke’s 1694 Memorandum (and More Incomplete Copyright Historiographies) 
(Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Jacob Burns Institute, Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 167, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=936353. More 
recently, Mossoff’s Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, although focused 
on more modern issues, claims that Lockean theory influenced the development of intellectual prop-
erty in the early years of the Republic. Adam Mossoff, Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Ad-
ministrative State, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001 (2009). Where I do not see that Locke himself applied 
his theory to literary works, both Mossoff and Hughes maintain that he did. 
 7. For thorough treatments of “how and when in Western history music came to be the subject 
of proprietary claims vindicated by law,” see Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music is it Anyway?: How 
We Came to View Musical Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405, 1408 (2004); 
Michael W. Carroll, The Struggle for Music Copyright, 57 FLA. L. REV. 907 (2005). James Boyle 
writes that among the many articles taking up questions of music and copyright, these are “[t]he two 
articles that influenced me the most.” JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE 
COMMONS OF THE MIND 278 (2008) [hereinafter BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN]. 
 8. For a thorough discussion of the extension of copyright to photographs, see Christine Haight 
Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 385 (2004). 
 9. Some notable contributions to this literature include KEITH AOKI, JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER 
JENKINS, BOUND BY LAW (2006), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/cspd/comics; Keith Aoki, 
Pictures Within Pictures, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 805 (2010); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on 
Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277 (2006); 
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural 
Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006). In addition to being among the first to take up these issues, 
Aoki, Boyle, and Jenkins are symbolically at the fore of the movement; in Bound by Law, they used 
the comic book format to address an intended audience of artists rather than lawyers. They are mov-
ing squarely in the direction of music in their upcoming comic book, Theft: A History of Music. 
KEITH AOKI, JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER JENKINS, THEFT: A HISTORY OF MUSIC (forthcoming 2011). 
For more extensive bibliographic references, see BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 7, at 
277–83. 
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Less attention has been paid to the process by which records be-
came entitled to copyright protection. This is an important area of inquiry 
because even though the recording industry poses as the defender of a 
timeless norm prohibiting unauthorized copying, records did not origi-
nally fit the contours of copyright law. Copyright for sound recordings 
was once controversial, and in resolving the controversy, the law dedi-
cated itself to some improbable propositions with consequences stem-
ming from the quiet operation of the common law theory. In the broadest 
sense, these consequences can be understood as an inversion in the rela-
tionship between copyright and culture. 
At the outset, it will be helpful to clarify two points. This Article 
argues that the development of the law has resulted in what I have 
termed “the inversion of culture and copyright.” What is meant by this 
phrase is that while copyright is formally justified by its critical role in 
fostering creativity and the development of culture, it has actually taken 
pride of place so that culture is being forced to take on the shape of its 
copyrighted container. The notion that copyright exists in order to en-
courage creativity has grown into a dogmatic proposition that there is no 
creativity without copyright, which is obviously false in a factual sense. 
Nonetheless, it is becoming truer and truer in a legal sense; that is, the 
law requires us to believe in an essential connection between copyright 
and a flourishing culture, even when there may be no connection. Next, 
the phrase “common law copyright” can be vague and confusing; in fact, 
this has frequently been an advantage to the advocates of common law 
copyright. In this Article, the phrase is used interchangeably with “natu-
ral law copyright,” and signifies a belief that copyright is a natural right 
that preceded any statute.10 Additionally, the phrase is commonly, but not 
necessarily, associated with a belief that copyright should be perpetual. 
The public domain is also the subject of much scholarly inquiry.11 
This issue is a cognate one because the expansion of copyright has often 
come at the expense of the public domain. Indeed, this issue is at the 
                                                 
 10. The phrase “common law copyright” can have several different meanings. I use the phrase 
to indicate a theory of copyright that asserts a timeless, common law or natural law basis for copy-
right, reflecting a moral right that existed even before any positive enactment. Thus, this Article does 
not use the phrase to refer more generally to bodies of common law copyright, such as state laws. 
 11. The public domain has become the focus of many scholars. Just a few who have considered 
the origins and meaning of the public domain include BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 7; 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Une Chose Publique? The Author’s Domain and the Public Domain in Early 
British, French and US Copyright Law, 65 C.L.J. 636 (2006); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 
39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 215 (2002). For a full bibliography, see BOYLE, Notes and Further Readings, in 
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 7, at 249–96 and Ginsburg, supra, at 638. 
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heart of Golan.12 The extension of copyright to sound recordings 
represents one of the most important instances of the struggle between 
copyright and the public domain; the inversion of culture and copyright 
that is the hallmark of common law copyright theory reflects our misun-
derstanding of the relationship between copyright and the public domain. 
It is true in some sense, as Jane Ginsburg puts it, that the “public domain 
is all the rage.” Yet, it is also true that the public domain has an equivoc-
al status, and that to the American legal mind, the public domain stands a 
distant second to the private domain of copyright. Noted copyright theor-
ist Zechariah Chafee, Jr. once described copyright as the “Cinderella of 
the law.”13 In its current state, the public domain is the place Cinderella 
would go to if she fell on hard times, and in large measure, this is the 
result of forcing culture to take on the contours of copyright. 
Ginsburg challenges what she takes to be “anachronistic assertions 
of the ‘immemorial’ quality of today’s aggressive concept of the public 
domain.” This Article argues that when we consider the issue as a ques-
tion regarding the relative priority of culture and copyright, it is rather 
the theory of common law copyright that is anachronistic, based on im-
probable propositions, and aggressive. 
Further, this Article addresses a question about the nature of com-
mon law copyright that has been raised by implication but rarely tackled 
head-on. Why has common law copyright endured? Numerous scholars 
have demonstrated that common law and natural law copyright are fic-
tions. As Jessica Litman observes, historians of copyright have “persua-
sively debunked” the notion of a “common law literary property right in 
17th century England.”14 Nonetheless, common law copyright has been 
                                                 
 12. This is not to say that the public domain is necessarily shrinking as copyright expands. As 
Tony Reese notes, Eldred v. Ashcroft confirmed in January 2003 the delayed entry of copyrighted 
works into the public domain in the same month that many unpublished works entered the public 
domain: “Two weeks before the Court’s decision, every unpublished work ever created by any au-
thor who died before 1933 entered the public domain.” R. Anthony Reese, Public but Private: Copy-
right’s New Unpublished Public Domain, 85 TEX. L. REV. 585, 586 (2007). 
 13. The full quotation is both pretentious and significant, suggesting as it does that copyright is 
somehow the friend of inventions capable of copying and transmitting: 
Copyright is the Cinderella of the law. Her rich older sisters, Franchises and Patents, long 
crowded her into the chimney-corner. Suddenly the fairy godmother, Invention, endowed 
her with mechanical and electrical devices as magical as the pumpkin coach and the mice 
footmen. Now she whirls through the mad mazes of a glamorous ball. 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright, in COPYRIGHT AND RELATED TOPICS 1 
(Los Angeles Copyright Society & UCLA School of Law eds., 1964). 
 14. Jessica Litman, The Invention of Common Law Play Right, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381, 
1388 n.41 (2010) (citing RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY 73–74, 195–210 
(2004) [hereinafter DEAZLEY, ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY]; RONAN DEAZLEY, RETHINKING 
COPYRIGHT: HISTORY, THEORY, LANGUAGE 63–65 (2006) [hereinafter DEAZLEY, RETHINKING 
COPYRIGHT]; 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:11 (2009); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS 
AND OWNERS, THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 22 (1993); Howard Abrams, The Historic Foundation 
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remarkably tenacious, and no amount of debunking seems sufficient to 
overcome it. This Article explores the problem by focusing not only on 
the myth of common law copyright but also on the mythology of common 
law copyright. What is the source of the common law vision, if not the 
law? As Litman writes of the nineteenth-century natural law copyright 
treatise author Eaton Drone, he was unconcerned with legal precedent, 
creating “his legal principles out of whole cloth” and discussing judicial 
decisions chiefly to demonstrate whether they were consistent with his 
own principles.15 Litman identifies a pattern of scolding the law for its 
failure to live up to philosophical principles, a pattern that goes to the 
heart of copyright for sound recordings. This Article addresses two ques-
tions that are raised by Litman’s observations: what was the whole cloth 
made of, and why has such a legally flimsy argument achieved such suc-
cess over a period of centuries? To put these questions differently, why 
has American law rejected the more obvious assertions of common law 
copyright and at the same time shown a predilection for more elegant and 
polite statements of the theory? 
Finally, if a comparison of the ethos of copyright for sound record-
ings with the ethos of copyright at the nation’s founding seems irrelevant 
to the modern music and movie industries’ claims, they have invited the 
inquiry. By insisting that the prohibition of unauthorized copying 
represents a universal and timeless norm, the recording industry has 
called for a reexamination of the history and theory of copyright. For 
years, the industry has pursued a well-publicized course of litigation in-
tended to protect its copyrights. It is attempting to establish a very broad 
duty to prevent copying, a duty that it explains in terms of a conventional 
moral prohibition by equating downloading movies with the theft of a 
car. At the behest of the recording industry, universities are quietly, but 
insistently, being pressured to protect recordings’ copyrights. The legis-
lative, judicial, and executive branches are combining to create a general 
duty to superintend the property of the copyright industries. 
Did the founding generation subscribe to the vision of copyright 
urged by the music and movie industries? Would James Madison, Tho-
mas Jefferson, and Benjamin Franklin have downloaded music and mov-
ies without paying for them? The answer might seem too easy, given the 
Founders’ punctilious defense of private property rights and their reputa-
tion as conservative businessmen and amateur economists. Yet, it is 
highly unlikely that the Founders would have aligned themselves with 
the modern copyright industries. 
                                                                                                             
of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 
1119, 1134 (1983)). 
 15. Litman, supra note 14, at 1424. 
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The historical milieu in which the Founders worked provides an in-
teresting comparison with the milieu that the music and movie industries 
are currently working hard to establish. Many of the Founders were 
themselves authors and inventors, and some educated guesses as to their 
attitudes on the relationship between copyright and the Internet may be 
hazarded. Further, while musical compositions became copyrightable 
long ago, there were no sound recordings when the Founders lived. Even 
after the invention of the sound recording, decades passed before records 
received copyright protection, suggesting that the Founders would be 
surprised to see how their copyright law was used. 
The Founders also provide an opportunity to conduct an important 
philosophical investigation into the nature of copyright. Intellectual 
property scholars commonly agree that copyright and patent laws serve 
utilitarian goals and that natural law comes in second.16 Nonetheless, the 
specter of John Locke continues to exert a peculiar and inappropriate 
influence on the law. While most courts and scholars appear to have con-
cluded that the true justification for intellectual property law is utilitarian 
and is not based on a Lockean theory of labor investment, the ghost of 
Locke is an especially tenacious apparition. Locke is a famous name 
whose labor theory of property fits so well with American sensibilities 
that he lulls us into ready acceptance of the likeness between intellectual 
property and conventional property. Not only does he induce people to 
think that the justification for intellectual property must be similar to the 
justification for more ordinary forms of property but he also forces the 
scholars who deny his influence to include him in their textbooks and 
casebooks. 
Although the theory that natural rights is the basis of copyright and 
patent has been formally discredited, it influences the law in a quiet but 
determined fashion. Apparently, whatever the law may say about 
Locke’s irrelevance, he seems to force at least the admission that copy-
right and patent are property, so that to oppose the rights of intellectual 
property is to oppose property itself. As the content industries like to put 
it, “You wouldn’t steal a car, so why would you download a movie?” 
Such an appeal is made in the belief that there is a moral core to the ar-
gument for intellectual property that is at the heart of all ownership. 
The Founders offer an interesting way to assess this belief. They 
have acquired a lasting reputation as defenders of the sanctity of private 
property, even as ruthless defenders of slavery. Despite their many mis-
givings, they were willing to sacrifice the “self-evident” human rights of 
others for the rights of private property. No sentimental attachment to 
                                                 
 16. See, e.g., id. at 1382; Abrams, supra note 14, at 1185. 
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borrowing and remixing would have led them to ignore true property 
rights, and if copyright and patent are like other forms of property, the 
Founders should be advocates of modern intellectual property rights. If 
they would have opposed the modern intellectual property rights, their 
opposition has something to say about the direction that the law of intel-
lectual property has taken. 
Ultimately, what emerges from a comparison of the past and 
present is a clearer understanding of the recording industry’s philosophi-
cal basis for what may be called natural law or common law copyright. 
The claim that copyright is the codification of a deeply rooted moral sen-
sibility protective of a natural right is also an assertion that copyright 
precedes communication—a counterintuitive and dubious notion that 
will be examined more fully below, but one most often expressed in the 
assertion that people will not create in the absence of a monopolistic 
economic incentive. 
What does it mean to say that copyright is made to precede com-
munication when it is obvious that communication came first, with copy-
right a comparatively recent development? Under the urging of the enter-
tainment industries and other copyright insiders, we have become accus-
tomed to accept the premise that people do not create in the absence of a 
monopolistic incentive. We have increasingly forced culture to take on 
the shape of its copyrighted container. It is certain that copying came 
before copyright. If it seems odd to say that the philosophy of common 
law copyright puts copyright ahead of communication, then consider this 
question: Why do we have histories of copyright in the 1790s but no his-
tories of copying?17 
II. COPYING IN 1790: PATRIOTIC PLAGIARISM AND MADISON’S 
PURLOINED FEDERALIST NO. 10. 
A. Madison’s Purloined Federalist No. 10 
Federalist No. 10 was James Madison’s most famous writing, and 
it was plagiarized from several essays written by David Hume. Madison 
dealt with the same problem confronted by Hume, which was the tenden-
cy of faction to undermine the public interest. In the language of the 
time, this was akin to the modern notion of private and selfish interests. 
Hume wrote incisively on the question of whether a large nation could 
                                                 
 17. See Craig Joyce & L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Found-
ers’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909 (2003). I am not, of course, suggesting that we should not have 
histories of early copyright but that our understanding of a right to prohibit copying must be in-
formed by understanding the extent of a right to copy. 
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survive as a republic and came to the original conclusion that it could.18 
He denounced the “falsehood of the common opinion, that no large state, 
such as France or Great Britain, could ever be modeled into a common-
wealth, but that such a form of government can only take place in a city 
or small territory.”19 Hume stated emphatically that nearly the reverse 
was true when it came to preserving a republic as opposed to founding 
one: “Though it is more difficult to form a republican government in an 
extensive country than in a city; there is more facility, when once it is 
formed, of preserving steady and uniform, without tumult and faction.”20 
Madison likewise countered the conventional wisdom by insisting 
that larger republics would prove more resistant to factions than smaller 
nations, and apparently found in Hume a most convenient source for his 
arguments.21 Hume wrote, “In a large government . . . the parts are so 
distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, 
or passion, to hurry them into any measures against the public interest.”22 
In Federalist No. 10, Madison proposed a very similar view on the solu-
tion to the problem of faction: 
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and 
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will 
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if 
such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who 
feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each 
other.23 
Madison copied without acknowledgment from at least three of 
Hume’s essays: Of the First Principles of Government, Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth, and Of Parties in General. Plagiarism is one thing, but 
the norms of modern copyright law cast Madison’s furtive copying in a 
still darker light. Not only did he plagiarize by taking the general idea 
without attribution but by modern standards he might also have infringed 
on Hume’s copyright by copying exact phrases and by taking the “heart” 
of the work.24 Hume died in 1776 and thus was unable to expose Madi-
                                                 
 18. DAVID HUME, IDEA OF A PERFECT COMMONWEALTH (1742), reprinted in HUME: THEORY 
OF POLITICS 242 (Frederick Watkins ed., 1951). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Several scholars disagree with Douglass Adair about the extent of Hume’s influence on 
Madison, most notably Edmund S. Morgan. For the lively controversy, see Mark G. Spencer, Hume 
and Madison on Faction, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 869 (2002). Spencer concludes that Hume did indeed 
influence Madison directly. Id. 
 22. HUME, supra note 18, at 243. 
 23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 24. See Douglass Adair, “That Politics May be Reduced to a Science”: David Hume, James 
Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 93, 97–105 (Trevor 
Colbourn ed., 1974). 
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son’s barefaced piracy. That left it to twentieth-century historian Doug-
lass Adair to discover Hume’s influence on Madison and to see how 
closely Madison’s essay followed Hume’s; it was not Adair’s concern to 
engage in moral or legal characterizations.25 
Madison’s takings from Hume may represent two different kinds of 
copyright infringement. This was explained by the Honorable Jon New-
man—years before his expansive opinion in Universal City Studios v. 
Corley26—in Warner Brothers v. ABC.27 First, copying small amounts of 
text here and there amounts to “fragmented literal similarity,” while the 
overall similarity between the works demonstrates “comprehensive non-
literal similarity,” duplicating the “fundamental essence or structure of a 
work.”28 Historian Adair’s characterization of Madison’s copying sug-
gests just such a duplication: 
Madison had no capacity for slavish imitation; but a borrowed 
word, a sentence lifted almost in its entirety from the other’s essay, 
and, above all, the exactly parallel march of ideas in Hume’s “Par-
ties” and Madison’s Federalist No. 10 show how congenial he found 
the Scot’s way of thinking and how invaluable Hume was in the fi-
nal crystallizing of Madison’s own convictions.29 
Hume thus provided the material for Madison’s most famous piece of 
literary property, Federalist No. 10, inspiring both the statement of the 
problem and the solution. Hume also supplied Madison with the goal of 
distinguishing himself “by memorable achievements the first place of 
honour [that] seems due to Legislators and founders of states.”30 In other 
words, Madison brazenly used Hume’s own literary property in order to 
achieve immortal fame as the preeminent Founder of the United States. 
If the norms of plagiarism and copyright are founded in a law of 
human nature, it is obvious that Madison is in trouble, for his Federalist 
No. 10 violated both. As one of the people responsible for the introduc-
tion of the law of copyright and patent into the United States, he seems to 
be caught in an unseemly and hypocritical position. The copying that 
went into Federalist No. 10 is similar to that in Harper & Row Publish-
ers v. Nation Enterprises, in which The Nation magazine, having ob-
                                                 
 25. Id. 
 26. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 27. Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 28. Id. at 240, 242 (quoting Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 13.03 [A] [1], [2] (Mathew Bender 2010)). 
 29. Adair, supra note 24, at 103. 
 30. DAVID HUME, OF PARTIES IN GENERAL (1742), reprinted in HUME: THEORY OF POLITICS 
168 (Frederick Watkins ed., 1951). 
2011] The Recording Industry v. James Madison 85 
tained a “purloined manuscript” of former President Gerald Ford’s me-
moir, copied enough of the language to capture the “heart of the book.”31 
A consideration of the ethos of copyright and patent at the nation’s 
founding suggests a different relationship between human nature and 
copyright than the one now promoted by the industries. Madison would 
not have been ashamed if his plagiarism and copyright infringement were 
discovered, for at the time, this kind of copying was common. Benjamin 
Franklin copied rather freely, as did many contemporary authors. The 
music and movie industries are attempting to attach copyright to the most 
deeply held moral restrictions on stealing; to them, plagiarism and copy-
right infringement are sister offenses that tear at the institution of proper-
ty. To Madison’s generation, there seemed no such connection. Addi-
tionally, while the industries assert that the norm is universal, Madison’s 
blatant copying of Hume, coupled with the fact that common law copy-
right was purely English, points to the positive character of the law and 
away from any foundation in natural right. 
Franklin helps make this point. Not only was he a plagiarist by to-
day’s standards but he was also an inventor who did not seek patents. 
Franklin was a notable scientist in his time and his accomplishments 
were recognized by Americans and Europeans alike. In 1762, David 
Hume wrote a letter to Franklin indicating his high regard for Franklin’s 
intellect: “America has sent us many good things; gold, silver, sugar, 
tobacco, indigo, etc., but you are the first philosopher, and indeed the 
first great man of letters for whom we are beholden to her.”32 The Comte 
de Buffon, one of the European philosophers and scientists who had 
propagated the theory that Americans were degenerates, nonetheless cre-
dited Franklin for his achievement in harnessing lightning. Franklin nev-
er sought a patent on any of his inventions, saying, “As we enjoy great 
advantages from the inventions of others, we should be glad of an oppor-
tunity to serve others by any invention of ours; and this we should do 
freely and generously.”33 
B. The Shallow Roots of Intellectual Property in the Early Republic: 
Thomas Jefferson and the First Patent Troll 
The Founders were not particularly shy about copying, suggesting 
that there was no widespread feeling that copying was wrong. When 
Americans passed patent and copyright laws, they did not codify com-
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mon law rights; in fact, Thomas Jefferson’s famous dispute with Oliver 
Evans offers evidence that the roots of the law were quite shallow in the 
early years of the Republic. Jefferson’s credentials in patent law have 
been challenged by Adam Mossoff,34 but Jefferson’s most famous foray 
into the debate over the nature of intellectual property offers important 
clues about how shallow these roots were in the new nation, more than a 
decade after the passage of the first patent and copyright acts. 
Jefferson’s 1813 letter to Isaac McPherson concerning the patents 
held by Oliver Evans became famous by virtue of the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, which determined 
that an improvement to a plow was unpatentable for obviousness.35 Jef-
ferson was a handy source for the Court, which pointed out that Jefferson 
had himself invented a plow for which he did not seek a patent. Jeffer-
son’s lack of interest in patenting his invention is important indeed,36 but 
attention has tended to focus on his more abstract reasoning regarding 
the desirability of the ownership of ideas, and less on the greater signi-
ficance of the protracted conflict that took place between Evans and the 
many people whom he accused of infringing his patents. 
The controversy has a seamy side that tells us more about attitudes 
toward patents in the early 1800s, for Oliver Evans was the first Ameri-
can patent troll.37 To be fair to Evans, he was apparently an inventor of 
note, so he does not fit the profile of the modern patent troll in this re-
gard.38 On the other hand, he policed his inventions and enforced his pa-
tent rights strictly enough to make any modern patent troll envious. He 
also sought to lengthen the term of the patent based on the argument that 
the patent belonged to the inventor just as surely as real estate to the dis-
coverer of “a piece of unlocated land.”39 
He enjoyed both successes and failures, his failures leading him in 
1809 to burn a sheaf of writings that apparently contained inventions of 
various sorts. His explanation of the unusual action was that he wanted to 
spare his children a lifetime of fruitless invention, but his subsequent 
return to invention, patenting, and patent infringement suits suggest that 
Evans was somewhat unstable. His frustration highlights a more impor-
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tant point when it comes to establishing the milieu in which patent and 
copyright came into being, for it also indicates that his view of the natu-
ral rights basis of patent law—the American version of the common law 
justification—held little sway in either the law or public opinion.40 
In explaining his unhappiness at congressional inaction, Evans him-
self indicated that people generally did not agree with him on the impor-
tance of using the law to secure inventors’ rights for an adequate length 
of time. He asserted that there was a general feeling in support of inven-
tors’ rights: “He that creates or produces a thing that never before ex-
isted, is by common consent, and the laws of nature, the only true pro-
prietor, as no other person can possibly have any claim or right to it.”41 
Yet, this “common consent” appears to have arisen more from wishful 
thinking on Evans’s part than from widespread public sentiment. Evans 
lamented that the inventor’s proper entitlements were recognized neither 
by Congress nor by the community: “Inventors are so few in number, 
that they are never represented in legislation, and cannot defend their 
rights, but are subject to the rest of the community, who forget to legis-
late, to protect such property as inventors produce.”42 Perhaps the mass 
of his fellow citizens disagreed with him, or perhaps they simply had no 
opinion on the nature of intellectual property rights. In either case, the 
inference is that there was no widely shared belief that protection of in-
tellectual property sprang from some deep Lockean wellspring in Ameri-
can culture, and that the law did not represent the codification of tradi-
tion. Jefferson confirmed this point in a letter to Evans by noting that the 
matters over which the two disagreed had never been decided, and that 
many issues would need to be resolved by future adjudication.43 He sug-
gested that it was premature to decide these points of patent law “when 
so new a branch of science has been recently engrafted on our jurispru-
dence, one with which its professors have till now had no call to make 
themselves acquainted.”44 
In other words, patent law and copyright law were young in the 
United States. The law did not codify a tradition and did not appear to 
express the general sense of the public. They did not have a legal or cul-
tural history in the United States, and they did not spring from a body of 
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custom or a conventional manner of thought about a social contract. 
When Americans of the founding generation thought that a right had a 
basis in the social contract or in natural law, they were never shy to say 
so. If they did not say so with regard to intellectual property, it must be 
because either they did not believe it, or it had not occurred to them. 
To be sure, as Adam Mossoff argues, there was some support for 
the view that natural law formed the basis of patent and copyright law,45 
as the conflict between Evans and Jefferson shows. The conflict also 
shows the weakness of the natural law position in patent law. Evans 
spoke a language of inventors’ property rights very similar to the modern 
language of authors and ownership, while Jefferson spoke the language 
of public benefit. Evans promoted the idea that patent right was a natural 
right that should be extensive, while Jefferson insisted that it was a right 
conferred by the public in order to further the public interest, and that it 
should be accordingly limited. And to judge by his writings, Evans felt 
that his position was a lonely one with little social or legal support. 
The novelty of the law in these early years is important. The theory 
of common law copyright, described in detail below, paints copyright 
law as springing from a primordial past and confirming timeless rights. 
Scholars have expended much ink on the question of what the Founders 
thought about what we now call intellectual property, but it is not clear 
that they thought much about it at all. This is what might be expected of 
“so new a branch of science,” as Jefferson put it.46 The Founders enacted 
copyright in the hopes of future achievements beneficial to the public. As 
the Supreme Court later stated in Wheaton v. Peters, (the American ana-
logue to Donaldson v. Beckett)47 in passing the Copyright Act of 1790,48 
Congress “instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, 
created it.”49 
C. The Goal of American Cultural Equality and the  
Myth of Lockean Copyright 
If the Founders were neither codifying natural law nor giving legal 
expression to a culture of copyright and patent that already existed, it 
remains a fair question to ask what they were doing by bringing copy-
right and patent into being. 
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What did they think that copyright meant? This is, at least initially, 
a difficult question about which there is little direct evidence. Nonethe-
less, the context of the Founders’ enactments allows us to draw conclu-
sions about their overriding purposes. While most of the state copyright 
statutes of the 1780s mentioned the author’s entitlement in the preamble, 
referring in some cases to natural law and natural right, that entitlement 
was nothing like the perpetual right that the owner of real property en-
joyed. The author’s right was severely restricted in accord with the pub-
lic purposes that the statutes were meant to serve.50 In contravention of 
the notion that there was a common law copyright that antedated statuto-
ry copyright, it also appears that those who introduced copyright and pa-
tent wrote on a nearly blank slate. There was a robust tradition of the 
protection of conventional property in colonial America; there does not 
seem to have been any corresponding tradition in what we now call intel-
lectual property. 
The striking policy considerations underlying copyright in the 
Founding era are the promotion of American culture, equality, and the 
increase of federal power. Much attention has been focused on Noah 
Webster’s travels on horse from state to state lobbying for legal recogni-
tion of the rights of the author.51 Much less attention has been paid to the 
nature of the works that copyright sought to protect and to the kind of 
people who pressed for copyright acts. The most prominent proponents 
of copyright laws were notable advocates of a distinctly American cul-
ture that would serve as the equal of European culture.52 
Tyler Ochoa and Mark Rose argue that the Founders had a deep 
suspicion of monopoly that led them to offer copyright protection only 
for a very limited time.53 American copyright and patent law also reflect-
ed the desire of Americans to take aim at another monopoly—a pre-
sumed European monopoly over intellectual and cultural products, ex-
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pressed in an attitude of disdain toward Americans. One of the chief mo-
tivations in establishing copyright and patent laws was the desire to es-
tablish Americans as the equal of Europeans. The American Revolution 
was a very public repudiation of an English imperial theory that had 
sought to make colonial Americans into a permanent underclass on the 
theory that Americans were degenerate Englishmen, at best half-
Englishmen who did not deserve the rights of true Englishmen.54 In a 
similar but more philosophical vein, famous European thinkers specu-
lated that Americans were degenerate Europeans. After the Revolution, it 
became imperative to establish the equality of Americans with Euro-
peans, and artists, authors, and scientists strove to create a uniquely 
American culture that could match Europe’s finest creations. 
The result was a burgeoning national literature explaining and ex-
alting America, the most prominent example of which was Jefferson’s 
Notes on the State of Virginia, first circulated in France. A host of others 
followed him in the attempt to create an American culture worthy of re-
pudiating the degeneracy thesis, and the most famous advocates of copy-
right were among them. Noah Webster, Joel Barlow, and David Ramsay 
were notable early proponents of copyright, and each of them was in-
tensely concerned with demonstrating that the United States was the 
equal of Europe.55 Webster promoted the development of a distinct 
American language that might one day prove superior to the English lan-
guage. One of the most zealous early proponents of copyright, he insisted 
that language reform was necessary because “an attention to literature 
must be the principal bulwark against the encroachments of civil and ec-
clesiastical tyrants” and because he wanted to break America’s depen-
dence on English books.56 
The literature that came from this movement was thus truly national 
and animated by an attachment to equality. The most obvious equality 
that they sought was that between Europeans and Americans, but this 
equality was simply part of a more thoroughgoing republican equality 
that had quickly taken over the American stage in the two decades after 
the Revolution. Even geography and arithmetic took on a decidedly re-
publican cast, as did representations of family life in fiction. Given that 
the European and English critique of American degeneracy had empha-
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sized inequality, it was natural that the American repudiation of the 
theory would insist on equality. 
Copyright was supposed to promote Americanism and an American 
version of republican equality, both of which were intimately concerned 
with the public good. Accepting this view has proven surprisingly diffi-
cult because of the competition offered by a Lockean theory of intellec-
tual property. Although Locke himself does not seem to have applied his 
theory of property to copyright, and the Founders were attached to a ra-
ther different theory, the Lockean view that traces intellectual property to 
a right founded in the creator’s labor has been strangely persistent. This 
persistence, which stresses the private character of the right, is difficult 
to account for in legal terms, given the evidently public character of both 
copyright and patent law in these early years. It can be explained in part 
by a reflexive tendency in American law to justify all forms of property 
by a single theory: that one who invests his labor in a thing is entitled to 
the thing. 
The Lockean explanation of intellectual property has a vagueness to 
it that is functional; it provides a convenient philosophical origin that 
serves as a substitute for the more questionable historical origins of intel-
lectual property. Both copyright and patent represented the exercise of a 
prerogative power on the part of government that is foreign to Americans 
and embarrassing from a modern point of view. It is more natural to 
think in Lockean terms. Copyright in England had its origins in censor-
ship, which was to be secured through placing all rights of publication in 
a company of booksellers.57 The role of the infamous Stationers’ Com-
pany in enforcing censorship in early modern England is widely recog-
nized, but the relationship between copyright and its censorious antece-
dents may not be fully appreciated.58 
Licensing and censorship created a corporation that had outlived its 
usefulness with the expiration of censorship at the end of the seventeenth 
century, so the Stationers’ Company went to work securing its status by 
asserting the rights of the author as the justification for copyright. Lock-
ean labor had almost nothing to do with the creation of copyright, but the 
desperate need of the London booksellers to maintain their monopoly 
did. And thus, they began a campaign emphasizing the right of the au-
thor, which after decades of agitation bore legal fruit in 1769 with the 
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famous decision in Millar v. Taylor.59 Millar gave the booksellers their 
common law perpetual copyright, but it was to last only until 1774, when 
the House of Lords took the right away in Donaldson v. Beckett.60 The 
booksellers recognized their defeat and quickly sought parliamentary 
relief in the form of a bill, but they did not get it. In 1774, it was clear 
that common law copyright was not the law. 
By the time American states began enacting copyright laws in the 
1780s, the Lockean view had lost its brief hold on English law. Ameri-
cans had little reason to think of copyright as a traditional common law 
right, and the laws they passed did not indicate otherwise. 
As I have suggested, however, Locke’s specter is a tenacious one. 
Well more than 100 years after the Copyright Act of 1790, when it came 
time to decide whether sound recordings should be protected under copy-
right and whether protection would be consistent with the Constitution, it 
exerted its influence on American shores. Common law copyright was 
legally dead, but it remained spiritually alive. 
III. WRITINGS THEN AND NOW: CONSTITUTIONAL INSOUCIANCE AND 
THE ADVENT OF COPYRIGHT FOR SOUND RECORDINGS 
 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution permits Congress 
to offer copyright protection to “Writings.” While the recording industry 
now appears to be the natural steward of copyright law, sound recordings 
did not always enjoy copyright protection, and historically, records had 
either to satisfy or evade the writings requirement. It may seem that the 
prohibition of copying recordings is based on timeless natural law, but 
records did not achieve copyright protection quickly or easily, and the 
story by which they did is important in an assessment of the traditional 
contours of copyright. 
At the nation’s founding, copyright law covered only maps, charts, 
and books. Now recorded performances are “Writings” protected by 
copyright.61 So are dances, buildings, vessel hulls, semiconductor chips, 
and computer programs.62 Can fashion design be far behind? The Eldred 
Court warned that it would look askance at a fundamental departure from 
the traditional contours of copyright law,63 and a consideration of the 
ever-expanding categories of subject matter covered by copyright is just 
such a departure. Copyright term extension pales in comparison. 
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The point is not that the Clause should be construed so narrowly 
that only writings in the most literal sense should qualify for copyright. 
The language of the Constitution has been interpreted broadly in a num-
ber of areas, notably in Commerce Clause and First Amendment juri-
sprudence. It is not simply the fact that there have been expansive 
changes; rather, it is the nature of the changes that have taken place and 
the manner in which they have been justified that are at issue. It is one 
thing to extend the original purpose of a constitutional provision, and yet 
another to run entirely counter to it. It is as much the manner as the sub-
stance of the departure from the writings requirement that leads to the 
observation that there has indeed been a fundamental departure from the 
original contours of copyright law. One of the best indices of the depar-
ture is the expansion of copyrightable subject matter. 
First, the process by which records found their way into copyright 
law is telling, marked by what I characterize as “constitutional insou-
ciance,” championed by insiders, and justified by an anachronistic and 
counterintuitive philosophy dressed up as if it were in accord with com-
mon sense and supported by historical evidence. Second, the triumph of 
the sound recording, and the various other subject matters that have fol-
lowed, represents more than a simple departure from the original con-
tours of copyright law. It represents a near reversal. 
It does not require faith in a narrow constitutional textualism to see 
that the increase in subject matter that may be copyrighted signals cor-
ruption in the law. The departure from the writings requirement is symp-
tomatic of a radical and largely unstated change in the purpose of copy-
right law, which once included a “legibility” requirement in the early 
years of copyright, indicating that copyrighted writings were meant to be 
read. In its early years, copyright was supposed to be pressed into the 
service of a distinctively American culture. Charts were to be created and 
used; maps were to be charted and followed so that the American hinter-
land might be further discovered; and books were to be written and read 
so that the American character might be strengthened. 
It is not a textual quibble to note that the law appears to have aban-
doned the limitation imposed by the word “writing.” It is rather to note 
that the extension of copyright to a variety of subject matters that are not 
writings represents a subversion of the purpose of the law—to allow the 
public to understand. Copyright has been subjected to a steady onslaught 
of subject-matter extension. This extension is problematic because it is 
premised on a vague combination of the inapposite Lockean theory of 
copyright, formally discredited in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone 
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Services64 as the “sweat of the brow” theory, and an equally inapposite 
unfair competition theory.65 It does not fit well with the historical justifi-
cation of copyright as a means to achieve public purposes. Next, quite 
apart from the dubious elements of unfair competition and Lockean la-
bor, the steady progression of the law also raises a constitutional issue. 
The Constitution allows Congress to protect writings under the Copy-
right Act,66 and some justification would seem to be in order for the pro-
tection of sound recordings, which are not evidently writings. 
What should be made of the constitutional question of whether only 
writings can be protected under the Copyright Act? Two interesting stu-
dies written in 1956 and 1957—the first commissioned by Walter Deren-
berg and written by law students at New York Law School, the second 
written by future Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer—seemed to 
agree that the best way to deal with the problem was to consider it and 
then ignore it. Derenberg’s study, The Meaning of “Writings” in the 
Copyright Clause of the Constitution, begins by observing that a “literal 
reading of this clause would invalidate part of every copyright law 
passed since 1790 and prevent any copyright protection for such present-
ly protected matter as advertising, photographs and motion pictures, 
paintings, maps, cartoons, and three-dimensional objects.”67 The piece 
concludes by observing that it “seems reasonable to assume that no copy-
right statute passed by Congress allowing copyright protection to new 
forms of expression will be declared unconstitutional. This is so, despite 
the discussion in some cases that certain objects are not ‘writings’ within 
the meaning of the Constitution.”68 What the author appears to conclude 
here is that the constitutional limitation imposed by the word “writings” 
can safely be ignored. 
Future Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer came to a similar 
conclusion in her study on copyright and sound recordings. She first 
raised the question of whether “[r]ecords are not ‘writings’ since (a) they 
are not legible, (b) the Supreme Court has held that they are not ‘copies,’ 
and (c) they are material objects or mechanical devices and thus belong 
under patent rather than copyright protection.”69 Any one of these objec-
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tions would seem to lead to the conclusion that records are not writings, 
but Ringer concluded without much analysis that “[r]ecent decisions, 
together with the weight of opinion of the many commentators on this 
subject, seem to have weakened, if they have not destroyed, the force” of 
this argument.70 
This is really to say, as the Court in Eldred suggested by sanction-
ing the most recent term extension on the basis that there had been pre-
vious extensions,71 that if the constitutional objection is ignored for long 
enough it ceases to be troubling. The law has continued to follow this 
course, refusing to consider whether something is enough of a writing to 
warrant constitutional protection.  
If Madison, Jefferson, and Franklin were to make peace with the 
march of copyright, they would need to not only accept vast changes in 
the limits of the law but also accept an accompanying lack of justifica-
tion that leaves the stated purposes of the law untouched. They would 
also be confronted by glaring inconsistencies, for although the law would 
attempt to assure them that copyright protects only expressions and never 
ideas or functions, the assurance would be belied by the de facto protec-
tion that is often afforded. If they were to ask where and when this sort of 
copyright protection originated, they might be surprised to be told that it 
predated the United States as the product of English common law. 
IV. COMMON LAW COPYRIGHT AND SOUND RECORDINGS 
There is more to the story of copyright for sound recordings than 
wishing away the constitutional language of “writings.” There had to be 
some motivation for the extension of copyright, some explanation that 
made common law copyright attractive enough to make us forget wheth-
er records were actually writings deserving of copyright protection. The 
story of how copyright was extended to records is an important one in 
large measure because it aids in the understanding of how a sweeping 
departure from copyright’s original contours was accomplished. Despite 
the recording and movie industries’ attempts to pose as the stewards of a 
copyright law based on a timeless principle, it took a long time for 
records to come under the protection of the law. The arguments support-
ing the extension of copyright to records are also interesting, both for 
their insouciance as to the constitutional basis for the law and for their 
close resemblance to arguments made and discarded centuries ago. 
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Copyright for records was essentially a clever replay of the means 
by which publishers in eighteenth-century England had extended their 
control over books from an old licensing regime intended to enforce cen-
sorship to a newer copyright regime intended to further the education of 
the public in Britain and the “Progress of Science and the Useful Arts”72 
in the United States. Their first resort was to something resembling con-
tract. In a series of moves reminiscent of London’s eighteenth-century 
booksellers, and presaging the practices of modern software licensors, 
they simply declared that unauthorized copying of sound recordings was 
unlawful. Records were sold with legends resembling modern clickwrap 
and shrinkwrap licenses, specifying the record’s uses and claiming that 
the purchaser had agreed to the restrictions. 
More importantly, suits were brought under state law theories of 
misappropriation and common law copyright infringement. Initial fail-
ures were followed by successes, most notably the 1955 decision in Ca-
pitol Records v. Mercury Records, a case in which the Second Circuit 
decided that sound recordings were protected, not by federal copyright 
law, but by New York law on the basis of common law copyright and 
unfair competition.73 The case evidences the tendency that lies at the 
heart of the expansion of copyright: while admitting that federal copy-
right law did not at that time extend to sound recordings, the court 
seemed intent on remedying a failure of federal law to live up to its true 
principles.74 A largely imaginary private right was the focus, with no at-
tention paid to the public benefit that is the sine qua non of federal copy-
right law. Copyright for sound recordings was the result of a process that 
disregarded the public benefit that lies at the heart of federal copyright 
law. It was ostensibly crafted in order to benefit authors. It was the prod-
uct of an inapposite combination of unfair competition and common law 
copyright, and it was based on a spurious right that had never existed—
but one that is highly compelling to the American legal imagination, an 
imagination predisposed to think that there must have been a common 
law right for centuries. 
The extension of copyright protection under state law also 
represented the codification of a theory that inverts the relationship be-
tween culture and copyright, a theory that envisions a culture in which 
people will not communicate unless they are assured of a right to prohibit 
copying of their communications, as discussed below. 
This theory, although never formally passed into law, has had far-
reaching influence. It is not as far a leap as it may first seem from copy-
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right for sound recordings to copyright for computer programs, build-
ings, dances, vessel hulls, and semiconductor chips. On the basis of a 
vague idea, as Professor Chafee put it, that we are supposed to transform 
“the natural justice of copyright into positive law,”75 and that new crea-
tions have great value and thus deserve to be protected,76 we have fallen 
into the habit of ignoring the constitutional basis of the law of copyright. 
In the process, copyright has been pushed farther and farther from the 
principles on which it was founded and in the direction of its ostensible 
common law origins. 
A. The History of Common Law Copyright and the  
Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett 
Common law copyright is the product of a rather fanciful version of 
history and an improbable philosophical vision. It relies on a story that 
cannot start at the beginning and that is populated by characters of myth-
ical proportion, such as John Locke and William Shakespeare.77 The cha-
racters are truly mythical because they bear little resemblance to the his-
torical Locke and Shakespeare and are made to espouse views the real 
individuals unlikely held. In fact, it would be more accurate to describe 
the history of common law copyright as a history of events as they 
should have taken place, from the point of view of adherents of common 
law copyright. Because there is little evidence indicating that the original 
prohibitions on copying came into being as a consequence of authors’ 
demands, the theory of common law copyright posits a class of authors 
who must have desired such protection. 
The result is a view of the nature and origins of copyright that is 
based on a great deal of faith in some very unlikely propositions. As is 
widely known, copyright in England was the stepchild of state-sponsored 
censorship, and although our modern credo insists that people will not 
create in the absence of a monopolistic incentive to publish, the regula-
tion of printing came into being precisely because people were writing 
too much without any such incentive.78 And they were writing on things 
that mattered most: affairs of state and religious issues.79 Censorship, 
however, is not an attractive starting point for the story of common law 
copyright. That story prefers to begin with the famous decision in Millar 
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v. Taylor80 and to avoid Donaldson v. Beckett.81 For if Donaldson can be 
made to go away, then surely in 1790, Americans were passing the result 
of Millar into American law, recognizing and codifying the view that 
copyright was a common law right of perpetual duration. 
This leaves the result in Donaldson to explain away, a process that 
has a lengthy and noble lineage. As copyright historian and theorist Ro-
nan Deazley notes, Justice Graffeo’s 2005 New York Court of Appeals 
opinion in Capitol Records v. Naxos of America82 shows the influence of 
“the long shadow which the orthodox (and erroneous) accounts of Millar 
and Donaldson still cast upon current copyright doctrine and dis-
course.”83 
To see how the avoidance of Donaldson is related to sound record-
ings, there is no better place to start than in a brilliant essay written by 
copyright attorney John Whicher in 1961, entitled “The Ghost of Do-
naldson v. Beckett.”84 This essay attempts to persuade readers that there 
is a natural or common law basis for copyright that has not received due 
notice. Whicher’s essay should be better known because of the systemat-
ic nature of its argument, which helps to explain the otherwise myste-
rious success of the theory of common law copyright. 
“Do the dry bones of Donaldson v. Beckett live again?”85 So begins 
this formidable piece of adversarial scholarship, a lively attempt to 
breathe the spirit of the common law into copyright and thus extend the 
subject matter of copyright into a wider variety of areas.86 The question 
states the purpose of the piece, which is to cast doubt on the legitimacy 
and reach of the Donaldson decision. The ghost is the spirit of the deci-
sion itself, an apparently pesky apparition engaged in a centuries-long 
quest to rob common law copyright of its rightful authority. 
The gist of Whicher’s argument is that Donaldson v. Beckett was 
never properly the law, neither in England nor America, for a variety of 
reasons that are essential to understanding the tenacity of the myth of 
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common law copyright.87 First, Donaldson was not clearly the law in 
England because its result was uncertain. After conceding, as an ethical 
adversary must, that Donaldson overruled Millar, Whicher asserts that it 
was nonetheless unclear what Donaldson actually did decide: “But when 
we ask what doctrine, precisely, the Lords preferred to that which they 
thus cast aside, Clio (that coy muse) simply shrugs.”88 Referring to con-
fusion among the various reports of the case, he contends that subsequent 
ages supplied unwarranted clarity by concluding “that the decision was 
based on the theory that the statute did ‘impeach or take away’ the com-
mon law right in published works.”89 This supposed lack of clarity stands 
in contrast to the certainty of the Millar decision, which announced the 
true law of copyright in 1769, only to be plagued by the ghost of Do-
naldson v. Beckett—a series of mistakes and misunderstandings obscur-
ing the purity of the common law vision. 
Second, according to Whicher, if the meaning of Donaldson was 
unclear in England, it was not even the law in America, making the case 
for common law copyright purer still. He could make the case’s result 
uncertain in England, but he could not make it go away. America pro-
vided a brighter prospect, for the news of Donaldson might have failed to 
cross the sea. Perhaps Americans did not even know of the case! Further, 
he thought he saw evidence that American booksellers already believed 
in a common law copyright, and he proudly observed that Massachusetts 
had produced a copyright law in 1672, predating the Statute of Anne and 
showing that “Yankee ingenuity thus framed a primitive copyright act 
more than a quarter of a century before the English Statute of Anne was 
passed.”90 In addition, according to Whicher, James Madison was a pro-
ponent of perpetual copyright and a supporter of the decision in Millar v. 
Taylor—all of which provides a shorthand way of saying that Americans 
were unaware of the Donaldson case and that in passing their own copy-
right statutes, they were endorsing Millar’s common law view.91 
                                                 
 87. For drama, Whicher’s presentation cannot be beaten. He writes of the issue in Donaldson 
as “the unlaid ghost of a question that was asked nearly two centuries ago.” Id. Although the ques-
tion had been answered in America as well as in England, he argues otherwise in equally florid 
language: “Today it haunts the constitutional foundations of American copyright law, seeking the 
requiescat of a final answer.” Id. 
 88. Id. at 126. 
 89. Id. at 133. 
 90. Id. at 136–37. 
 91. Id. at 138–49. The basis of Whicher's view is Madison’s “reference to common law copy-
right” in The Federalist No. 43, which “made clear . . . American approval of the booksellers’ doc-
trine.” Id. I have argued elsewhere that this passage does not lend support to the common law view. 
See Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Software and Shovels: How the Intellectual Property Revolution is 
Undermining Traditional Concepts of Property, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 143, 156–57 (2007). 
100 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:75 
Whicher’s views are worth considering because they are at once 
elegant and fanciful, purportedly historical but based more clearly in 
faith than in evidence. It would seem that if Americans really had meant 
in 1790 to endorse the result in Millar v. Taylor, the contours of copy-
right law in the United States would have conformed to the common law 
view from an early date. They did not, and in order to trace Millar’s in-
fluence, Whicher takes an enormous stride ahead in time to the famous 
International News Service v. Associated Press case, decided by the Su-
preme Court in 1918,92 and then to its migration to state courts, particu-
larly those of New York.93 
The legacy of International News, according to Whicher, was the 
emergence of state law doctrines of unfair competition and misappropria-
tion in connection with works of authors. And despite the relatively new 
character of the doctrines, what he found striking about unfair competi-
tion in particular was “the virtual identity of the right it enforces with the 
old, eighteenth century conception of a common law copyright in pub-
lished works which Blackstone had set out in the Commentaries and Jus-
tices Willes, Aston, and Lord Mansfield had defended with such vigor 
and brilliance in Millar v. Taylor.”94 The new right and the old right 
share several essential characteristics: first, the rights primarily protect 
the rights of authors; second, they are confined to original works; third, 
they are property rights.95 
Given the near identity discerned by Whicher between the new 
right and the old right, and their common emphasis on copyright as an 
author’s right of property, we might well ask, “What old common law 
copyright?” But to ask that question would be to miss the import of the 
argument, which is that to the supporters of common law copyright the 
right must be timeless. Despite their aversion to historical evidence, they 
must find the origins of copyright in a distant and dignified past, the kind 
that the phrase “common law” is supposed to bring to mind, and in a ne-
cessary and beneficial relationship between effective communication and 
the regulation of the printing press.  
Focusing on the ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett is a clever way of 
admitting that Donaldson superseded Millar, but only technically, while 
implying that the decision is a moribund distraction from the true spirit 
of copyright that Millar endorsed. Within its adversarial bounds, the es-
say is executed ethically, and Whicher is rather determined to convey the 
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impression that there has always been a common law copyright that re-
cognizes an extremely strong property right in authors. 
There has never been such a right in the United States, and there 
was one in England for just five years, as noted above. The brilliance of 
Whicher’s argument lies in the sleight of hand that first presents this to 
the reader and then leads her to forget it. After dealing with the defeat of 
the common law right first in England in Donaldson and then in the 
United States in Wheaton v. Peters,96 he adds two nonrights together to 
get a complete right, identifying a modern common law right with an 
“ancient” common law right, each of them an author’s property right.97 
The conversion of a nonexistent right into a right of property might 
seem a feat of which only an academic is capable, but Whicher was a 
practicing attorney, and his statement of the issue is really a restatement 
of a long-influential attitude. The argument has several tendencies impor-
tant to the extension of copyright law, including the emphasis on the au-
thor’s entitlement considered as a property right, without reference to a 
corresponding public benefit. More importantly for the common law 
theory, the new right turns out to be nothing less than a manifestation of 
the old right, which survived centuries awaiting its proper recognition in 
positive law.  
B. The Theory of Common Law Copyright and the Inversion of  
Communication and Copyright 
Whicher’s history is actually a philosophical statement of what the 
law of copyright should have been in the past—a statement on the con-
tours of an ideal copyright law. Common law copyright relies on a defec-
tive historical account, which of necessity ignores the actual circums-
tances under which copyright came into being. It is nonetheless a psy-
chologically seductive foundation built on a very questionable philosoph-
ical position on the relationship between communication and copyright. 
As suggested above, the conventional justification has to do with a vague 
notion of rewarding authors for their labor under a natural right theory, a 
seemingly innocent notion that accords well with American sensibilities 
regarding the origin of property. Yet, the innocuous Lockean attitude 
conceals a far more sweeping and surprising theory, most clearly stated 
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by Judge Leibell in his 1939 district court opinion RCA v. Whiteman.98 
Judge Leibell insisted that there had been a performer’s right in sound 
recordings before there were record players, and the passage is worth 
quoting at length: 
Prior to the advent of the phonograph, a musical selection once ren-
dered by an artist was lost for ever, as far as that particular rendition 
was concerned. It could not be captured and played back again by 
any mechanical contrivance then known. Thus the property right of 
the artist, pertaining as it did to an intangible musical interpretation, 
was in no danger of being violated. During all this time the right 
was always present, yet because of the impossibility of violating it, 
it was not necessary to assert it.99 
This statement supplied Barbara Ringer, noted previously for her 
lack of interest in whether the Constitution permits copyright for sound 
recordings, with the basis for asserting that recorded performances 
should be copyrightable: “It appears settled that the contributions of per-
forming artists to a sound recording constitute an original intellectual 
creation, and are therefore eligible for common law copyright protec-
tion.” The Second Circuit reversed Judge Leibell in RCA,100 and it is in-
teresting that a future Register of Copyrights was so anxious to show that 
records were copyrightable that she would rely on a decision that had 
been reversed. Perhaps she was right to do so, however, for Leibell’s 
view as to the common law property and unfair competition issues was 
eventually to prevail, and it sheds real light on the thinking of those who 
defend the common law or natural law basis of copyright. 
Judge Leibell’s statement is based on a counterintuitive view of the 
relationship between communication and copyright. In his view, com-
munication is predicated on the ability to prohibit copying. This implies 
that people who engage in ordinary communication are actually “per-
forming” with the expectation that they can prohibit “copying” if they 
choose. In other words, long before the invention of either the sound re-
cording or the printing press, when people spoke, sang, or wrote, they 
were not trying in the first instance to communicate with one another but 
were deciding whether to protect their performances or not against copy-
ing.  
Like Whicher, Judge Leibell believed in a natural right to prohibit 
copying. Taken together, they offer the theory that quietly overcame the 
constitutional objections to copyright for sound recordings raised (and 
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dismissed) by Barbara Ringer so long ago—“[r]ecords are not ‘writings’ 
since (a) they are not legible, (b) the Supreme Court has held that they 
are not ‘copies,’ and (c) they are material objects or ‘mechanical devices’ 
and thus belong under patent rather than copyright protection.”101 Their 
theory, however, was simply a modern version of a very old theory 
adopted in Millar.102 When copyright was extended to sound recordings, 
a constitutional limitation on the scope of copyright was removed (or 
ignored) and an eighteenth-century English apparition, the ghost of Do-
naldson v. Beckett,103 was laid to rest. 
V. THE FICTIONS OF COMMON LAW COPYRIGHT: FROM SHAKESPEARE 
TO MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 
How has common law copyright, which has been so fully and for-
mally discredited, continued to live such a vibrant life in the shadow of 
the law? How has it managed to distract us from constitutional limita-
tions? The answer is that it appears to make sense. What it lacks in histo-
ry, the theory of common law copyright attempts to make up in a philos-
ophy whose principles are supported by illustrious and unimpeachable 
personalities from the past, and it offers a vision of the relationship be-
tween copyright and communication that corresponds with the view pro-
pounded by Leibell and Whicher. Judge Leibell’s appraisal of the time-
less nature of the right is probably the purest philosophical statement of 
the basis of common law copyright, but it is not the most attractive. His 
view is too stark and perhaps too transparent to withstand scrutiny. But it 
can be expressed via several more palatable propositions: first, that copy-
right is essential to effective communication; second, that the necessary 
intermediary between the author and the reader is the printing press. 
These beliefs are in turn dedicated to the general proposition that copy-
right is intuitively sound, fair, and forward-thinking—that its precepts 
are found in our law because they make good sense. 
To take the last of these propositions, there is the notion that the 
Copyright Act104 is simply a positive affirmation of a natural right. Cha-
fee’s influential Reflections on the Law of Copyright provides one of the 
most attractive statements of the purpose of the Copyright Act: to trans-
form “the natural justice of copyright into positive law.”105 
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What is the natural justice of copyright law, and how natural is it? 
This question requires an assessment of the elements of common law 
copyright that serve to make it plausible, the first of which is its time-
lessness. Even if it does not have a history, the theory of common law 
copyright has a past of a different kind, a nonhistorical past. The histori-
cal past of copyright is unattractive to the modern audience, but common 
law copyright has a philosophical past that consists primarily of two 
items: (1) the immemorial right of the author (or performer) to prohibit 
unauthorized copying, and (2) the printing press. Where the history of 
copyright would tend to call our attention to censorship and corporate 
monopoly, the theory of common law copyright begins with a seemingly 
obvious statement about the relationship between printing and communi-
cation. Its goal is to make an intuitive connection between the imme-
morial right of the author and the statutory copyright introduced by the 
Statute of Anne in 1710, without the inconvenience of discussing corpo-
rate monopoly and censorship. 
The theorists of common law copyright do not ignore the booksel-
lers entirely; in fact, as discussed below, they attach extraordinary impor-
tance to the invention of the printing press. They acknowledge the ori-
gins of copyright indirectly and without calling attention to the printers 
by asserting that the printing press provided a necessary connection be-
tween the interest of the author and copyright. 
The influence of this view is great; thus, in Sony Corporation of 
America v. Universal City Studios, the Supreme Court explained the ad-
vent of copyright as the necessary consequence of the invention of the 
printing press: “Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying 
equipment—the printing press—that gave rise to the original need for 
copyright protection.”106 What was it about the printing press that gave 
rise to the original need for copyright protection? The real answer is that 
the unregulated printing press allowed too many people to express too 
many views on religion and politics, and the government responded with 
an assertion of its prerogative power over the press—a prerogative power 
to regulate communication. 
Of course, that is not what the Court meant. The effect of the Sony 
Court’s statement (which is a partial quotation taken from a more accu-
rate assessment by Benjamin Kaplan) is rather to imply the necessity of a 
connection between copyright and effective communication, with copy-
right leading the way to mass communication. But to accept this implica-
tion is to turn a blind eye to the order in which events actually occurred. 
The appeal is undeniable: Who would want to deny the printing press its 
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rightful place in the history of communication, and in the same stroke, 
deprive authors of their common law rights to protect their work and the 
public of the opportunity to enjoy them? 
Who, moreover, would wish to stand in the way of technological 
progress? One effect of asserting a natural and necessary relationship 
between copyright and the printing press is to make copyright a forward-
looking proposition. As noted copyright scholar Paul Goldstein asserts, 
Copyright was technology’s child from the start. There was no need 
for copyright before the printing press. But as moveable type 
brought literature within the reach of everyone, and as the prefe-
rences of a few royal, aristocratic, or simply wealthy patrons were 
supplanted by the accumulated demands of mass consumers, a legal 
mechanism was needed to connect consumers to authors and pub-
lishers commercially. Copyright was the answer.107 
It all seems perfectly natural, and if not quite timeless, it is nonetheless 
old stuff. 
A. Practice in Need of a Theory: The Quest for Authors 
Copyright was an unusual answer, for it was not preceded by a 
question. The earliest adherents of common law copyright were Lon-
don’s bookseller–printers and their legal counsel. From late in the seven-
teenth century, their most formidable task was to fashion a question to 
which copyright was the answer. The question they were actually ans-
wering was not a very attractive one: “How can we protect our monopoly 
over publishing perpetually without the legal basis previously provided 
by the licensing acts in the furtherance of censorship?” As a 1709 peti-
tion for a new copyright act put it, a new law was needed to restrain “the 
liberty now set on foot of breaking through this ancient and reasonable 
usage.”108 The “ancient and reasonable usage” was the exclusive control 
over the book trade afforded by the licensing acts—the laws that en-
forced censorship by giving a monopoly to the Stationers’ Company. 
Mark Rose observes that London’s printers had not been shy about en-
dorsing censorship in the seventeenth century, making a direct connec-
tion between their own prosperity and the propagation of the truth that 
was the goal of censorship.109 He quotes a pamphlet published by the 
booksellers in 1643, after the collapse of censorship during the English 
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Civil Wars: “And commonly where Printing droops, and Printers grow 
poor by neglect of Government, there errors and heresies abound.”110 
Once censorship could no longer serve them, the task of the book-
sellers was to show that the ancient usage actually was reasonable in 
standing for something beyond their own interests, and they eventually 
posed the question, “How can the law protect the rights of authors?” This 
was a good question, for it called attention to the right of the author and 
away from the booksellers, even though the benefits of the law would be 
enjoyed by booksellers as well. 
The mythology of common law copyright began with a quest to as-
sert the interest of the publisher in the name of the author, and it began 
early. The “ancient and reasonable usage” was finding a modern justifi-
cation in the immemorial right of the author, the essential ingredient of 
the theory that would justify the perpetual copyright sought by the book-
sellers. In 1760, Alexander Wedderburn, arguing for the plaintiffs in 
Tonson v. Collins,111 delivered what was becoming a staple element of 
the mythology. Wedderburn began his argument with the general claim 
that an author’s labor entitled him to realize any profits that the publica-
tion might make: “From the industry of the author, a profit must arise to 
somebody: I contend it belongs to the author.”112 
Then he asserted that “[t]his right is recognized by the laws of Eng-
land” and explained copyright as a necessary consequence of the arrival 
of the printing press in England: “Manuscripts are quite out of the case. 
They could produce no profit. Therefore I shall begin from the introduc-
tion of printing by Caxton in 1471.”113 By this sleight of hand, the “wily 
Wedderburn” meant to direct attention toward the printing press (and the 
book that emerged from it) and to divert attention from the handwritten 
manuscript that preceded the printed book.114 
What is more, manuscripts also had authors and were also copied. 
That is why they had to be dismissed. The judges were not supposed to 
start thinking about monks and the copyright that they engaged in.115 
Thinking about manuscripts reminds us that there was once a literary 
world without copyright, and Wedderburn did not want to invite compar-
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isons that might call his theory into question. As Peter Yu observes, the 
“existence of a large number of scribes copying books every day” was 
not conducive to “a new property right in literary works.”116 The timeless 
right that Wedderburn sought to protect appears to have been asserted 
less by authors than by printers. 
One more reason to keep the manuscript out of the argument is that 
any lengthy consideration of the history of manuscripts would have 
called into serious question the relationship between the printing press 
and communication that Wedderburn sought to establish. Of course, the 
printing press was connected with the origin of copyright, but Wedder-
burn was not making the historically true point that the monarch’s desire 
to control printing led to a regime of censorship that was the direct ante-
cedent to copyright law. He was doing the opposite, making copyright 
“technology’s child from the start,” rather than “censorship’s child from 
the start.” He was also making a very broad statement on the necessity of 
copyright in a world in which the press served as the preeminent means 
of disseminating information and making profit. 
Wedderburn’s argument was “wily” in the manner in which it con-
nected the right of the author with the interest of the printer—by hiding 
the printer behind the author—and at the same time directed attention 
toward the printing press and away from the manuscript. Thus, the inter-
est of the publisher was quietly advanced as if it were identical to that of 
the author. An important part of the mythology was in place. From this 
point on, publishers found it convenient to make authors their mouth-
pieces.  
The dismissal of the manuscript furnished a still more important 
element: the notion that there is a necessary connection between creation 
and copyright, via the intermediary of the printing press. One conse-
quence of this connection is again to deemphasize the interest of the pub-
lisher, and another is to assign a priority to the printing press over other 
means of publication, prior and subsequent. The first of these is impor-
tant to the theory of common law copyright by virtue of its insinuation 
that copyright had always reflected a belief in the right of the author. 
B. Shakespeare, the Pirates, and the Printing Press 
Historically speaking, however, the proponents of the common law 
view were short of the authors needed to support the theory. Edward 
Thurlow, who argued for the defendant in Tonson v. Collins, appears to 
have been correct in contending that the privileges granted to printers in 
the earliest years of printing implied “no idea whatsoever of copy-right 
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in authors. They relate[d] merely to printers.”117  There were a few nota-
ble authors who supported copyright early in the eighteenth century, and 
according to tradition, Jonathan Swift authored the original draft of the 
Statute of Anne.118 But there seems to be no evidence supporting Swift’s 
authorship, and these few authors do not appear to be of much use to de-
votees of common law copyright—an immemorial right must find its 
authors in a more distant past. 
This deficiency has persisted for centuries. The theory continues to 
need important authors from earlier times, and what the theorists have 
always needed was an author so important as to stand above history—an 
author with mythical status who might illuminate the prehistory of copy-
right and thus obscure its more accurate but mundane history. In modern 
times, the gap has been filled by Shakespeare, who holds a surprising and 
illuminating place in the theory of common law copyright. Did Shakes-
peare hold a copyright, or more properly, a common law right against 
unauthorized copying? This question, which began to interest Shakes-
peare scholars nearly 100 years ago, is a figurative statement of the ques-
tion whether authors held something akin to a natural or common law 
copyright in the ages before copyright law proper. It is also symptomatic 
of the counterintuitive and posthumous role played by Shakespeare in 
providing copyright with more dignified origins. 
Shakespeare is the human embodiment of Whicher’s view of copy-
right history and Judge Leibell’s statement of the theory of copyright. As 
James Boyle has noted, divining Shakespeare’s intent is in some respects 
very similar to divining the Founders’ intent, and the many uncertainties 
surrounding Shakespeare make him an attractive mouthpiece: 
Just as the “Intent of the Framers” is used as an argumentative de-
vice to limit the range of interpretations of the Constitution, so the 
Shakespearean biographies seek to invent a richly detailed picture 
of the author, a picture which can then be used to constrain the in-
terpretation of the very works from whence it was drawn.119 
Shakespeare was just such a figure to the theory of common law 
copyright—an author who was morally entitled to prohibit the unautho-
rized publication of his plays, even before there was a copyright act, and 
if he had been a singer or trumpet player, he would presumably have as-
serted his right to prohibit unauthorized copying of his records. That is to 
say, Shakespeare fills a universal role by virtue of his putative right and 
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desire to prohibit copying, and in this sense, he corresponds very well to 
Judge Leibell’s prehistoric performer who holds a right to prohibit copy-
ing even before the means of copying has actually come into being. 
An expansive statement of such a view was presented in 1917 in A. 
W. Pollard’s Shakespeare’s Fight with the Pirates and the Problem of 
the Transmission of His Texts.120 Given the title, it is interesting that 
Shakespeare fails to appear frequently, if at all, in this monumental bat-
tle. The book is opaque but is suffused with a vague notion that authors 
in Shakespeare’s time enjoyed some sort of ill-defined literary property 
right, the invasion of which amounted to piracy. At the same time, al-
though some “pirates” were taking authors’ works against their will, 
there appeared an incipient if grudging ethos among printers acknowl-
edging the author’s right. Thus, even before the Statute of Anne, authors 
and booksellers were developing a reasonably harmonious relationship 
based on their recognition of authors’ rights. This notion accords with 
Pollard’s belief stated on the first page of the book and is consistent with 
the case made by London’s booksellers in the 1800s and the recording 
industry in the 1900s—that the historical development of copyright law 
began with a desire to protect the author’s rights, a protection necessi-
tated by the invention of the printing press. Expressing disappointment 
that scholars had not devoted attention to what he believed to be the gra-
dual development of the notion of literary property, Pollard suggested 
that the interests of the author and publisher were naturally intertwined in 
the age of the press: 
Legal writers on English copyright have not shown much interest in 
the steps by which the conception of literary property was gradually 
built up . . . . The accident by which our first English printer [i.e., 
William Caxton] was also an exceptionally prolific literary producer 
and possessed of considerable influence at Court might well have 
led to a very early recognition of an author’s rights to the fruits of 
his brain, had there been any competitor possessed of sufficient cap-
ital to be a really formidable pirate.121 
The misfortune of the history of copyright, then, is the absence in 
the fifteenth century of any pirate capable of forcing Caxton to exercise 
his indubitable right. Why did copyright not come into being at an earlier 
time? Because—remembering Judge Leibell’s insistence in RCA v. 
Whiteman that there had always been a right to prohibit the copying of 
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sound recordings—Caxton had a right that he did not need to assert be-
cause it could not be violated.122 
In Shakespeare, on the other hand, there was apparently an “excep-
tionally prolific literary producer” in an era when there were formidable 
pirates. Shakespeare thus is made to stand for a timeless moral right to 
prohibit copying and to stand in for all the authors harmed by the Do-
naldson decision. He also provides the critical connection with the print-
ing press—the early modern precursor to the phonograph recorder—as 
the instrument that demonstrated the inevitability and moral rectitude of 
copyright. 
C. Shakespeare and the Fictions of the Law 
Shakespeare’s most famous appearance in copyright law is proba-
bly in Judge Learned Hand’s famous 1930 Nichols opinion.123 In Nichols 
v. Universal Pictures Corporation, Hand explained that while what we 
now call “nonliteral” copyright can give rise to a claim of infringement, 
at some level of abstraction the copying is not actionable.124 Here, Sha-
kespeare was made to take on a somewhat different role than the one as-
signed to him by literary criticism; the role was to explain the reasona-
bleness of the precepts of copyright law. It would be impossible to in-
fringe merely by copying “Shakespeare’s ‘ideas’ in [a] play,” which 
were “as little capable of monopoly as Einstein’s Doctrine of Relativity, 
or Darwin’s theory of the Origin of Species.”125 He came into the case 
via a seemingly harmless exercise in anachronism, presumably because 
of the resemblance between the works at issue in that case and Romeo 
and Juliet,126 but less restrained jurists than Judge Hand have been pre-
pared to turn anachronism into a fighting faith. 
Shakespeare’s first role was to give common law copyright its in-
dispensable author, standing above and apart from an inconvenient histo-
ry, who demonstrates the necessity and reasonableness of copyright. In 
Nichols, he performs another service, which is to show that some of the 
most important tenets of copyright law are sensible and even intuitive.127 
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The theory of common law copyright, based as it is on the necessity of 
copyright as a matter of natural law and as a condition necessary to ef-
fective communication, requires us to believe things that are factually 
false, even though they may be legally true. Most prominently, a reve-
rence for intellectual property encourages the belief that people neither 
create nor invent without a monopolistic economic incentive, and Sha-
kespeare has been called into the service of this questionable proposition. 
At its extreme, this view leads to statements such as the following 
attempt, in a well-known article by Howard Kalodner and Verne Vance, 
to link Romeo and Juliet to copyright incentives. In relating the incentive 
idea to the idea and expression dichotomy, Kalodner and Vance write, 
“Progress is promoted by granting to Shakespeare the exclusive rights in 
Romeo and Juliet, but not by prohibiting others from writing plays about 
young lovers whose death, resulting from the belligerence of their fami-
lies, draws the families together in the common tragedy.”128 
That is an odd thing to say about a play that did not enjoy copyright 
protection, that Shakespeare himself never put into book form, and that 
was copied and printed shortly after his death without payment to his 
estate. As Lord Camden put the matter in arguing the winning side in 
Donaldson, 
[Shakespeare’s] works, which he left carelessly behind him in town, 
when he retired from it, were surely given to the public if ever au-
thor’s were; but two prompters or players behind the scenes laid 
hold of them, and the present proprietors pretend to derive that copy 
from them, for which the author himself never received a farth-
ing.129 
The “present proprietors” were printers, rather than authors, who inter-
posed themselves between the author and public in order to hold a mo-
nopoly. 
It is an odd, but not an accidental, thing to identify Shakespeare 
with the principles of copyright, for the history and theory espoused by 
Whicher and Leibell require human illustrations of improbable proposi-
tions. If the natural character of the law is to be demonstrated then heroic 
figures are needed. Judge Jon Newman, famous for his decision in Uni-
versal City Studios v. Corley, also used Shakespeare and Einstein to illu-
strate the intuitive character of the idea expression dichotomy: 
It would not be difficult . . . to tell Einstein that when he had the 
idea that E=MC2, others could copy and use that idea without pay-
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ment of license fees or infringement damages, and, on the other 
hand, to tell Shakespeare that when he wrote Romeo and Juliet, oth-
ers could not sell copies of his play without his permission (and a 
royalty payment to him).130 
The image of a federal judge lecturing to Shakespeare and Einstein 
on the principles of intellectual property is amusing, but it is also instruc-
tive. It is hardly accidental that a supporter of the incentive argument 
reaches into the (English) past in search not only of an author in need of 
copyright but an author who also lends credence to the premises of the 
law. It is difficult to see how Shakespeare is really fit for this role, for 
whatever Romeo and Juliet may show about the need for copyright law, 
it does not support the incentive argument. Shakespeare, himself a noto-
rious plagiarist, apparently did not let the lack of a copyright statute 
stand in the way of writing his plays and having them performed.  
One may object that Shakespeare’s importance is overstated here, 
that it is unfair to focus on the occasional and playful use of Shakespeare 
in order to illustrate some propositions about copyright law. Yet, it is 
telling that he is pressed into service of the most questionable proposi-
tions, as if attaching a founder of legendary stature to an assertion were 
enough to establish its truth. Shakespeare serves here as an antidote to 
history, and the playful use of Shakespeare is supposed to secure easy 
acceptance of some unlikely propositions. Given that people have always 
created in the absence of monopolistic protection, and that the idea and 
expression dichotomy itself makes sense only in its most abstract state-
ment, the theory of common law copyright needs an author who invites 
easy agreement. It is as if we were invited to a table with Shakespeare 
and Einstein in order to ponder the premises on which copyright is built. 
As they sat nodding in agreement while federal judges explained the re-
lationship between copyright and creativity, what ordinary person would 
dare to dissent? 
Finally, the use of Shakespeare is symbolic of the belief that lies at 
the heart of common law copyright theory—that copyright has a spiritual 
essence stemming from the immemorial right of the author, which is in 
turn dependent upon a particular machine. Pollard wrote of “Shakes-
peare’s Fight with the Pirates” in the faith that among “the steps by 
which the conception of literary property was gradually built up,” the 
very first step was to protect the author’s right to prohibit copying.131 As 
Pollard saw it, Caxton had the right but had no need to assert it. Pollard’s 
position, which is the position that Shakespeare is adduced to support, is 
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uncannily similar to Judge Leibell’s dubious assertion about the perfor-
mer who always had the right to prohibit copying of her performance but 
had no need to assert it before such copying was possible. 
If common law copyright’s history is a bit embarrassing and its 
central premises untenable, Shakespeare apparently diminishes the em-
barrassment.  
D. I Have a Dream and the Inversion of Copyright and Culture 
Once we have forced culture and communication into the unshapely 
vessel of copyright, the law teaches us to believe things that are legally 
true even though they are factually false. When Reverend Martin Luther 
King, Jr. delivered his famous speech, I Have a Dream, the world knew 
that it was witnessing a cultural event of the utmost importance with a 
message intended to reach the widest possible audience. Many welcomed 
the message, and many opposed it; many of those who opposed it must 
have wished that the message did not travel as broadly as it did. The 
speech was delivered on the National Mall in Washington, D.C. and was 
attended by approximately 200,000 people. The event took place on fed-
eral property, and federal marshals provided the security. The entire 
speech may, as of this writing, be viewed at www.youtube.com.132 
Its presence on YouTube, however, is a precarious one; it is access-
ible either because the executors of the King estate are content that it is 
available there or because they have failed to notice it. The precarious 
status of the event owes itself to the philosophy of common law copy-
right. In Estate of Martin Luther King v. CBS, the Eleventh Circuit grap-
pled with whether CBS was prevented from including portions of King’s 
celebrated I Have a Dream speech given on the National Mall in 1963.133 
It was clear to the court that the speech was a copyrightable performance; 
the vexing question was whether Dr. King dedicated it to the public and 
thereby divested it of copyright status. Refusing as it does to recognize 
what the speech actually was—a major cultural and social event as un-
suited to copyright as an event could be—this approach does not make 
sense, except that it conforms to the contours of copyright law. It is ap-
propriate to think of Romeo and Juliet as a performance but hardly ap-
propriate to think the same of a seminal speech of the civil rights move-
ment. 
In a legal universe in which copyright precedes communication, 
however, the pairing of I Have a Dream and Romeo and Juliet makes 
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sense. Fanciful notions are not troublesome to a mythology: Shakespeare 
is the author who would have sought a copyright had the law been wise 
enough to implement the true principles of copyright law during his life-
time, and King is what Shakespeare wished he could have been—the 
author who did avail himself of a copyright thus reserving to himself the 
decision of whether to “publish” a “performance” that took place in front 
of 200,000 live observers. This is the result of making copyright a foun-
dational norm, one that supersedes the desire to communicate and threat-
ens to impose a servitude on every new means of conveying information. 
The language of authors’ rights and natural law rings well in Amer-
ican ears, but it also has a deceptive simplicity that cloaks this servitude. 
If we are to understand it more fully, we will do well to pay attention to 
Judge Leibell’s statement in the early years of the sound recording wars. 
As discussed previously, he asserted that before “the advent of the pho-
nograph,” it was impossible to capture an artist’s musical performance.134 
“Thus the property right of the artist, pertaining as it did to an intangible 
musical interpretation, was in no danger of being violated. During all 
this time the right was always present, yet because of the impossibility of 
violating it, it was not necessary to assert it.”135 
Judge Leibell thus placed copyright before communication, given 
that in his view of society, people seek to guard their rights to their “per-
formances” before they are communicated, reserving a right to control 
any means of reproduction thereafter devised. This is a counterintuitive 
vision that bears examination because it is intimately related to common 
misapprehensions about intellectual property.  
In pursuit of the continuation of the monopoly it secured on the ba-
sis of technology that is now obsolete, the recording industry seeks to 
impose John Whicher’s and Judge Leibell’s philosophy of copyright in 
draconian fashion. The recording industry seeks to establish, in the most 
explicit terms, that copyright is a fundamental norm, sometimes even 
equating infringement with child pornography; as William Patry notes, 
Jack Valenti claimed that p2p software was responsible for the distribu-
tion of “the most throat-choking child porn . . . on a scale so squalid it 
will shake the very core of your being.”136 In 2010, groups representing 
the music industry, including the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA), sent an open letter to Google CEO Eric Schimdt ex-
pressing concern over net neutrality and placing copyright infringement 
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and child pornography right next to each other.137 In furtherance of what 
Patry describes as a campaign based on “moral panics,”138 they seek to 
protect their interests by all means possible—litigation, legislation, and 
education—and to make the inversion of copyright values complete by 
imposing broad public burdens to support private benefits. 
And while they do this in the name of the artist, just as London’s 
eighteenth-century booksellers touted the interest of the author, they are 
really justifying an “ancient and reasonable usage”—their monopoly 
over music. As one industry spokesman said in 1963, “I think it is the 
general, if not unanimous, view of the record industry that protection 
against unauthorized duplication should be embodied in the new copy-
right law; provided, of course, that the record manufacturer is designat-
ed as the copyright proprietor.”139 The similarity to the eighteenth cen-
tury should give pause, for even today, pragmatic attachment to the in-
terests of the intermediary can be obscured by the philosophical attach-
ment to the author, in a fashion reminiscent of Alexander Wedderburn’s 
1760 argument in Tonson v. Collins. 
VI. YOU WOULDN’T STEAL A CAR, SO WHY WOULD YOU STEAL 
LIGHTNING? BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AND THE TRADITIONAL 
CONTOURS OF COPYRIGHT 
It may seem anachronistic to return to the Founders after consider-
ing the history and theory of copyright for sound recordings. After all, is 
the Patent and Copyright Clause not forward-looking, making place for 
progressive protections in the interests of advancements in invention and 
creativity? The answer is that the theory of common law copyright, as 
argued above, is not as forward-looking as we might think. Change in 
copyright law has indeed been sweeping, but the nature of the change has 
in some respects been easy to overlook. It has been gradual, and it is easy 
to miss and to become accustomed to gradual change. Also, changes 
have typically been made in the name of progress, and they thus seem to 
accord with the forward-looking nature of the clause. To the casual ob-
server, the theory of common law copyright appears friendly to innova-
tion and innovators, and changes in copyright (and patent) are frequently 
promoted and viewed as promoting progress. 
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It is thus easy to forget that the triumph of common law copyright 
does represent a departure from the traditional contours of copyright, but 
it is a strange and anachronistic departure in the direction of a mythical 
past. The recording and movie industries have touted copyright as a 
friend to progress, and they have certainly succeeded in bringing about 
sweeping changes in the law. Lest these changes tempt us to think that 
the march of copyright law is progressive, it is important to see that the 
theory on which they have based their claims is hundreds of years old. 
The philosophy of common law copyright comes to us almost unchanged 
from the eighteenth century, and as argued earlier, theorists such as 
Whicher would take us back to the eighteenth century to show us the 
continued vibrancy of Millar v. Taylor.  
The project championed by Whicher, Judge Leibell, and others was 
to return copyright law to the bright moment represented by Millar in 
1769 and to import Millar’s view to American shores. This view is not 
tenable. The theory of common law copyright was available to and re-
jected, or perhaps not even considered, by the Founders. As discussed 
above, common law theorists, such as Whicher, have gone to great 
lengths to draw attention away from the Donaldson decision, and among 
other things, have claimed that Americans were ignorant of the decision 
when they enacted the Patent and Copyright Clause140 and the 1790 Cop-
yright Act.141 In other words, they maintain that American copyright fol-
lows the model laid out by Mansfield, Blackstone, and Alexander Wed-
derburn. This is a view that Benjamin Franklin’s confrontation with Al-
exander Wedderburn makes very difficult to sustain. 
A. Benjamin Franklin, Solicitor General Wedderburn, and Donaldson 
On January 29, 1774, Franklin, dressed in a suit of blue Manchester 
velvet, stood before Alexander Wedderburn—then England’s Solicitor 
General—and an assemblage of lords and ladies, including such notable 
figures as Edmund Burke and Jeremy Bentham.142 The dramatic scene 
demonstrated the depth of English contempt for American colonists. 
Franklin’s purpose was to present a petition on behalf of the colony of 
Massachusetts Bay for the removal of Governor Thomas Hutchinson and 
Lieutenant Governor Peter Oliver. But as Franklin sensed by the time of 
the event, the Solicitor General’s purpose was very different. For nearly 
an hour, Wedderburn harangued, harassed, and bullied Franklin, imply-
ing very clearly that Franklin was nothing more than a thief. 
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From Wedderburn’s perspective, Franklin stood before him not to 
present a petition but to be punished. Franklin was calling for Hutchin-
son’s removal on the basis of views that Hutchinson had expressed in a 
series of letters between himself and Oliver.143 These letters spoke of the 
Massachusetts colonists in very unflattering terms and suggested that the 
only way to deal with them was to take away their liberties. The letters 
came into Franklin’s hands via “a gentleman of character and distinction 
(whom I am not at present permitted to name),” as Franklin later 
noted.144 From Franklin’s hands they somehow found their way across 
the Atlantic and into print in the Massachusetts Gazette, causing a public 
outcry against Hutchinson and Oliver. 
Wedderburn claimed to be incensed at what he viewed as Frank-
lin’s unauthorized publication of a series of private letters. Franklin re-
mained quiet, motionless, and impassive for the whole of Wedderburn’s 
attack on him, but later justified his behavior by denying (implausibly) 
that he intended the letters to be published. 
Just a few weeks later, the same Wedderburn, a Scotsman, was ar-
guing on behalf of perpetual common law copyright and against the 
Scottish booksellers in the House of Lords in the famous case of Donald-
son v. Beckett.145 Franklin remained in London during this time, and it is 
nearly impossible that he missed the controversy over the source and na-
ture of copyright. The encounter with Wedderburn had been a memora-
ble one. During the harangue, Franklin stood silent and motionless for 
the entire time so as not to dignify either the substance or the style of the 
assault, but he later defended himself, remembered the incident bitterly, 
and it began to signal to him that his attempts to find common ground 
between imperial policymakers and American colonists were futile. 
When he attended the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783, he donned 
the same blue velvet suit for the occasion. Wedderburn had made his 
mark on Franklin, who had to know of his adversary’s appearance before 
the Lords on behalf of Thomas Beckett and the other Donaldson plain-
tiffs. 
The evidence that Franklin had to know of Donaldson goes beyond 
this coincidence. The two controversies were reported contemporaneous-
ly in the London newspaper the Public Advertiser, which carried a series 
of pieces attacking Wedderburn and defending Franklin. (At least one of 
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them was written by Franklin, as discussed below.) During these weeks, 
the paper also carried reports of the proceedings in Donaldson, and on 
February 16, 1774, it printed a defense of Franklin in the first column; in 
the second column, it printed Extract from the Argument in Defense of 
Literary Property by Francis Hargrave (in effect a publicly circulated 
amicus brief in Donaldson, arguing on behalf of the common law right); 
and in the third column, it printed a report that the Lords “proceeded to 
hear the Opinions of the Judges relative to Literary property,” that is, in 
the Donaldson case. This three-column coincidence makes it harder still 
to imagine that Franklin was unaware of the case.146 
Wedderburn’s attack on Franklin and on the Scottish booksellers 
took place within a small timeframe and within a small world of eigh-
teenth-century British public figures and intellectuals. David Hume, the 
philosopher whose own literary property would soon be purloined by 
Madison, wrote frequently to William Strahan, a plaintiff in Donaldson, 
and his letters display an intimate acquaintance with the issues that mat-
tered to authors and booksellers.147 A letter from Hume to Strahan writ-
ten on March 1, 1774, took up both “your great Cause concerning literary 
Property”—the Donaldson case—and Franklin’s treatment at the hands 
of Wedderburn, giving the opinion that there was “nothing treacherous or 
unfair” in Franklin’s behavior.148 In addition to suggesting that the two 
events were conjoined in the minds of learned people, Hume’s letters 
remind us that the literary world in which he and Franklin operated was a 
small one where authors were likely to know printers and understand the 
issues that engaged them. Franklin was a much sought after dinner com-
panion in fancy London and Edinburgh (and later Parisian) circles, and a 
noted scientist and author who had more than an ordinary interest in 
printing. 
Moreover, Franklin wrote books that were published in England in 
many editions. He would have had to try very hard to miss the news of 
Donaldson. He knew English printers personally, and it seems that two 
of his books were published by plaintiffs in the Donaldson case: Hume’s 
correspondent Strahan (whom Franklin knew well) and Thomas Beckett 
himself.149 Finally, he corresponded with both Strahan and Beckett, and 
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years before Donaldson was decided, observed to Beckett that because 
the Library Company of Philadelphia believed that the bookseller’s pric-
es were too high, they decided to buy no more books from him.150 At the 
bottom of a letter he wrote to Mary Stevenson in 1762, Franklin named 
Beckett, to whom Strahan was to give some of Franklin’s printing of Ci-
cero’s Cato Major (a translation by James Logan printed by Franklin in 
1744) to sell.151 In a 1763 letter, Franklin asked Strahan to “put Mr. 
Becket in mind to send me the French Work on the Arts as it comes 
out.”152 He also wondered what became of the 300 copies of Cicero’s 
Cato Major he had sent; even by 1782, he had no real answer, and Stra-
han indicated that he thought he gave them to Beckett, who was at that 
point bankrupt.153 
Franklin thought about Beckett often enough that his opinion of the 
printer changed over the years. In 1761, he described Beckett as “a very 
honest and diligent Book-seller.”154 Two years later, he conveyed the Li-
brary Company’s complaint of Beckett’s inflated prices. In 1764, he 
complained to Strahan, “I think I am slighted lately per Mr. Becket.”155 
When Franklin sought to present a petition from the Continental Con-
gress to King George in 1775, he found himself further slighted by 
Beckett. Franklin, William Bollan, and Arthur Lee, acting as agents for 
Massachusetts, had decided not to make the petition public until Parlia-
ment reconvened on January 19 so that the King could present the peti-
tion. Beckett beat them to it, printing it first in a pamphlet that the Amer-
icans described as “surreptitious as well as materially and grossly erro-
neous.”156 
Franklin’s encounter with Solicitor General Wedderburn in 1774, 
taken together with his interest in printing and his familiarity with the 
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world of London’s publishers and intellectuals, offers important evidence 
against the view that the Americas were unaware of the Donaldson deci-
sion and thus intended their early copyright acts to codify Millar v. Tay-
lor. Franklin had to know of Donaldson, and it is highly unlikely that 
when he attended the Constitutional Convention thirteen years hence, in 
1787, he allowed other Americans to believe mistakenly that Millar v. 
Taylor remained the English law of copyright.157 
B. Uploading the Literary Property of Public Figures 
The timing coincidence between Franklin’s appearance before 
Wedderburn and Wedderburn’s argument before the Lords in Donaldson 
offers important evidence that at least one very prominent American 
knew of Donaldson’s result. The substance of the event was also impor-
tant for another reason relevant to the history and theory of copyright: To 
Wedderburn’s mind, Franklin had to be rebuked, for he had stolen lite-
rary property. Franklin took a very different view, contending that his 
actions were appropriate because of the public nature of the subjects dis-
cussed in the letters. When Franklin appeared before Wedderburn he in-
tended to press for the removal of Governor Thomas Hutchinson of Mas-
sachusetts Bay, who had expressed rather unflattering views of the co-
lonists and called for an abridgment of colonial liberties. 
The copyright industries urge us to believe that when Franklin ap-
peared before Wedderburn on January 29, 1774, there was an ethos 
against unauthorized copying and distribution, one that expressed a 
commonly held moral sensibility. But was there? Wedderburn, about to 
argue the losing side in Donaldson in support of common law copyright, 
would appear to agree with the industries; he thought the matter self-
evident, insinuating unmistakably that Franklin was a thief. Wedderburn 
delighted his audience with a reference to Plautus, branding Franklin as a 
man of three letters, “fur” (the Latin word for thief).158 
Franklin’s published reply shows a strikingly different view of the 
relationship between culture and the protection of intellectual property, 
with clear modern relevance because Franklin stoutly resisted the impu-
tation that transmitting letters of public importance was tantamount to 
theft.159 In a pseudonymous letter in the Public Advertiser on February 
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16, 1774, Franklin pointed out facetiously that the greatest European 
thinkers agreed with Wedderburn’s assessment and, in fact, thought 
Franklin a more audacious thief than did the Solicitor General.160 In a 
passage likening Franklin to Prometheus for stealing fire from the sky—a 
reference to Franklin’s experiments with electricity—the author wrote 
first in French and then in English: 
To steal from Heaven its sacred Fire he 
taught, 
The Arts to thrive in savage Climes he 
brought: 
In the New World the first of Men esteem’d; 
Among the Greeks a God he had been deem’d.161 
The letter was signed “HOMO TRIUM LITERARUM,” i.e., a man of 
three letters, a thief.162 
Wedderburn, by contrast, spoke the language of London’s booksel-
lers, and if we translated his claim into modern terms, they would be re-
ceived equally well by the recording industry. He had accused Franklin 
of transmitting or “uploading” private literary property without authori-
zation and thus of being a thief. Franklin’s response corresponded with 
his attitude toward invention, as evidenced by his refusal to seek patents 
on his inventions, and it was at odds with the argument that Wedderburn 
was just about to make in Donaldson in support of common law copy-
right. 
When accused of being a thief for his distribution of literary proper-
ty, Franklin proudly accepted the mantle. Years later, when the Constitu-
tional Convention adopted the Copyright and Patent Clause, whose vi-
sion did they intend to enact? The one espoused by Wedderburn in Ton-
son v. Collins and in his losing argument before the Lords in Donaldson, 
delivered just weeks after his harangue against Franklin, or the one 
championed by Franklin, Jefferson, and Madison? 
VII. WHEN SELLING TRASH BECOMES COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: 
COPYRIGHT SHAPING CULTURE 
In the Eldred decision, the Supreme Court warned us to be alert for 
a departure from the traditional contours of copyright law.163 In eBay, the 
Court cautioned that patent law had to conform to traditional principles 
of jurisprudence, and in the area of patent, the Court has gone farther 
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still.164 More recently, in Bilski v. Kappos, which was expected to be a 
monumental decision on patentable subject matter, the Court affirmed a 
view that time-tested principles of patent law are adequate to resolve an 
array of modern patent issues.165  
The Court gives the appearance of being interested in maintaining a 
traditional continuity within the law of intellectual property, and copy-
right law has indeed departed in a fundamental and perverse way from its 
origins. The theory of copyright at the time of the nation’s founding has 
gradually been giving way to a variety of powerful influences. Copyright 
for sound recordings may now seem a natural extension of copyright law, 
but it actually signaled the adoption of principles that had no previous 
basis in the law and that stand on unsound historical and philosophical 
ground. 
The subject matter of copyright has grown in defiance of principle 
and without regard to the constitutional clause permitting Congress to 
enact legislation to protect writings; we have moved in the direction of a 
legal regime premised on the notion that copyright represents a timeless 
natural right. This has resulted not only in protection for nonwritings, 
such as recordings, but also in the extension of the equivalent of patent 
protection under the aegis of copyright law. 
To see this departure more clearly, it is helpful to look at the opera-
tion of the norm that the industries are establishing. The version of copy-
right propounded by the copyright industries, representing as it does an 
inversion of the public and private burdens and benefits of the original 
purpose of American copyright law, has still broader consequences for 
the public. The virulent pursuit of legal means to enforce socially unten-
able propositions has resulted in a strange reversal by which the copy-
right industries enjoy private benefits via the imposition of broad social 
burdens. 
A. United States v. Chalupnik: Distribution of Trash as 
Infringement and Statutory Damages 
The most bizarre illustration of the inversion of public and private 
comes from the case of James Chalupnik, who in 2007 became a victim 
of the spirit of copyright for sound recordings.166 Chalupnik was a cus-
todial supervisor with the U.S. Postal Service in Fargo, North Dakota.167 
The Postal Service had arranged with BMG to destroy undeliverable CDs 
and DVDs, and over a period of years, Chalupnik secretly rescued many 
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of these disks from the trash and sold them to local record stores.168 His 
secrecy was not sufficient, however, for he was discovered and charged 
with felony mail theft.169 Pursuant to a plea bargain, Chalupnik pleaded 
guilty to copyright infringement, and the district court ordered him to pay 
restitution to BMG in the amount he realized from the sale of the CDs 
and DVDs—a sum in excess of $78,000 dollars.170 The Eighth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s ruling that BMG was qualified to recover 
under the Mandatory Victims’ Recovery Act (MVRA), but it vacated the 
award of restitution and remanded with instructions that the government 
must show proof of loss before BMG could receive any money.171 
Chalupnik represents an ominous step in the history of copyright. It 
seems to stand for the proposition that there is a general public obligation 
to tend to the property of copyright holders; thus, the government en-
forces criminal sanctions on behalf of BMG. BMG’s standing as a victim 
under the MVRA is also peculiar, for BMG did not show any evidence 
that it held any of the copyrights in question. Further, the value of the 
disks to the participants in the case raises important questions regarding 
economic waste and copyright remedies. Chalupnik was able to sell the 
disks for more than $78,000, but to BMG, they were not worth the cost 
of postage. In the ordinary civil copyright case, statutory damages are 
available even in the absence of proof of loss, so a copyright holder 
might well recover handsomely from infringement of copyrighted ma-
terial destined for the trash. 
Although Chalupnik’s conviction points to a new and frightening 
phase in the extension and enforcement of copyright law, it is only a re-
cent and logical extension of more distant developments. Just forty years 
ago, before sound recordings received copyright protection, Chalupnik’s 
actions could not have amounted even to civil copyright infringement. 
But a combination of constitutional insouciance and a psychologically 
compelling, but vaguely defined, natural law theory has created a strong 
presumption in favor of broadening the range of copyrightable subject 
matter. Not only has the subject matter expanded but the rights have also 
evolved, reaching the point at which copyright threatens to become a 
peculiar hybrid right—under which benefits are purely private and bur-
dens are borne by the public. Originally, the public purpose of the law 
was clearly paramount, with the private benefit to the author considered 
as important, yet incidental. 
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In the strangest of inversions, not only has the law become more 
protective of private interests but it also has moved decisively in the di-
rection of creating a broad social obligation to tend to their copyrighted 
“property.” The result is the gradual imposition of a general duty to pre-
serve rights attached to an outmoded technology and to impose a servi-
tude on newer means of communication and transmission of information. 
In this instance, the old technology is embodied in sound recording appa-
ratus, while the servitude is imposed, for the moment, on p2p software 
and devices that promote “circumvention.” 
The Chalupnik case is still more instructive when considered in 
light of statutory damages awards issued in suits against downloaders 
and uploaders. The disparity in Chalupnik—that disks not worth the 
price of postage could be sold by someone without a distribution network 
for $78,000—is striking enough, but consider that in a civil copyright 
case, the copyright holder can receive statutory damages in lieu of actual 
damages, doing away with the requirement of harm and permitting the 
plaintiff to receive a minimum of $750 per act of infringement to a max-
imum of $30,000.172 The amount of statutory damages can be staggering. 
In Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset, a jury originally awarded 
$220,000 to Capitol on the basis of twenty-four songs; a second trial re-
sulted in an award of $1.92 million, an award later reduced to $54,000 by 
Judge Michael Davis. In a third trial, the jury awarded $1.5 million—
$62,500 per song, an amount reduced again to $54,000 by Judge Da-
vis.173 Even this lower amount reflects an award of $2,250 per song. In 
BMG v. Tenenbaum, a jury awarded $675,000 on the basis of thirty 
songs, subsequently reduced to $67,500 on constitutional grounds by 
Judge Nancy Gertner.174 Moving from Chalupnik to Thomas-Rasset and 
Tenenbaum takes us not only to the question of what kind of economic 
disparities the law will allow but also what kind it will breed. 
The rationales offered in support of statutory damages are hollow: a 
United States Department of Justice brief in the Thomas-Rasset case ar-
gues that it is difficult to calculate actual damages, and there is a need for 
deterrence in furtherance of the public interest.175 Neither justification is 
plausible; each of them illustrating that the extension of copyright is, in 
large measure, an assault by copyright upon culture, justified by the so-
lemn repetition of untrue premises. Why does the government not ob-
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serve that statutory damages as applied to file-sharing are unjustifiable? 
As Pam Samuelson and Tara Wheatland observe, “Awards of statutory 
damages are frequently arbitrary, inconsistent, unprincipled, and some-
times grossly excessive.”176 
These are large awards in themselves. When considered on a per-
song basis, they become staggering, and when compared to the harm that 
an illegal download actually causes, they appear senseless. As Judge 
Gertner noted in the Tenenbaum case, “Each of the songs that Tenen-
baum illegally downloaded can now be purchased online from the iTunes 
Music Store and other retailers for approximately $0.99 or $1.29 a piece. 
And for each $0.99 song sold on the iTunes Music Store, it appears that 
the recording companies only receive about $0.70.”177 Thus, Joel Tenen-
baum is required to pay $2,250 for a song he could have purchased for 
$0.99 and gives the industry considerably more than the $0.70 it would 
have received. 
Does copyright law need to adapt to changes in culture? Seemingly 
not, according to a number of courts considering the issue of what consti-
tutes innocent infringement for the purposes of assessing statutory dam-
ages under Section 504(c). On November 29, 2010, the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in Harper v. Maverick Recording, a case involving 
songs downloaded by Whitney Harper when she was sixteen years old.178 
In Harper, the district court ruled that whether Harper could qualify as 
an innocent infringer under Section 504(c)(2), which would reduce the 
statutory minimum damages from $750 per violation to $200, was a fac-
tual question to be resolved by a jury.179 The Fifth Circuit reversed, hold-
ing that Section 402(d) precluded Harper as a matter of law from proving 
that she was an innocent infringer.180 Section 402(d) provides, as Justice 
Alito wrote in dissenting from the denial, 
that if a prescribed notice of copyright ‘appears on the published 
phonorecord or phonorecords to which a defendant . . . had access, 
then no weight shall be given to . . . a defendant’s interposition of a 
defense based on innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or 
statutory damages.’181 
There is a problem, as Justice Alito observed, in applying section 
402(d) to a case that does not involve “phonorecords” or any “material 
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objects” that would afford notice of copyright to someone who was 
downloading files over the Internet.182 In such an instance, he wrote, 
“[T]he question would simply be whether the infringer ‘was . . . aware 
and had . . . reason to believe,’ that the downloading was illegal.”183 In 
ruling that Harper’s knowledge of whether her behavior was illegal was 
irrelevant, the Fifth Circuit declined to take her age into account. Justice 
Alito took exception to the appellate court’s indifference on this count, 
suggesting that Harper’s “youth and lack of legal sophistication were 
relevant considerations.”184 
Legally speaking, however, we remain in the age of the phonore-
cord, in which the sound recording enjoys a legal ascendancy that seems 
quite out of keeping with an outmoded technology and that appears to be 
asserted all the more strongly on account of its irrelevance. Tony Reese 
has written that copyright law’s hostility to innocent infringement is a 
modern development, and that it was only between 1909 and 1989 that 
“almost all of copyright law’s original safeguards protecting innocent 
infringers eroded.”185 (A period of time that coincides rather nicely with 
the history of the sound recording.) The Court did not share Justice Ali-
to’s opinion that the case was worthy of review, which leads to the suspi-
cion that it remains under the influence of the view that the modern print-
ing press (sound recording apparatus) is the necessary instrumentality 
connecting author (or performer) and public—with the publisher and 
record company hiding behind the scenes. 
Justice Alito noted that section 402(d) was enacted in 1988, years 
before downloading over the Internet was possible, an observation indic-
ative of a healthy interest in the relationship of law, technology, and cul-
ture.186 He might also have noted that it was enacted just sixteen years 
after federal copyright protection was extended to records, despite the 
industries’ claims to stand on the basis of a timeless moral prohibition 
against unauthorized copying. The legal ascendancy of the sound record-
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ing is of comparatively recent vintage, the consequence of a real depar-
ture from the traditional contours of copyright law. In order to accept that 
it makes sense, we must be made to believe in several propositions that 
are not true: that the idea and expression distinction exists in nature, that 
people do not create in the absence of monopolistic incentives, and 
that—to give just one example—when Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered 
his I Have a Dream speech, he was engaged in a “performance” in the 
nature of a play or a rock concert, which perhaps he did not “publish” by 
performing it in front of 200,000 people, on federal property, and with 
federal protection. 
Given the importance of the teenager to the copyright industries’ 
campaign and the dire need to reshape cultural moral sensibilities, there 
may be something to be said for the view taken by the Fifth Circuit in 
Harper and by the Seventh Circuit in BMG Music v. Gonzalez.187 Per-
haps it is an appropriate time to put teenagers on general notice of what 
they will be required to believe in order to preserve the industries’ mo-
nopoly. Perhaps it may not be an appropriate time to invite them to think 
about whether the law makes sense. As Eben Moglen has noted archly, 
“[T]welve-year-olds do a better job of distributing music than the music 
companies.”188 The point should be carefully considered because the 
copyright industries are obviously targeting youth in an effort to educate 
them in copyright law and its supposed values. The attempt to found 
copyright on a universal norm, a natural law, is in the long run, an at-
tempt to say to the youth of the nation that copyright corresponds to their 
values. 
When copyright comes before culture, it means that values must be 
made to conform to the law, and it might thus be unwise to allow teens to 
comment on the values that underlie the law. Teenagers may be less 
enamored of technology that appears archaic, and may not understand 
why rules that came about when transmission of information was diffi-
cult and expensive should continue to apply when transmission is easy 
and inexpensive. They may likewise find it difficult to understand why 
the law should support monopolies built on this archaic technology, 
while suppressing technology that promises easy distribution. They may 
not comprehend that statutory damages far out of proportion to actual 
damages actually make sense, and that their innocence as to the legality 
of their activities cannot, as a matter of law, qualify them as innocent 
infringers obligated to pay only $200 for a download with an actual value 
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of no more than $1—because the CDs, from which they did not obtain 
their unauthorized copies, bore copyright notices. They may not perceive 
that prosecutors must ensure that CDs earmarked for destruction do not 
wind up in record stores, or that an enterprising custodian must be pu-
nished for turning trash into $78,000, or that for selling trash he was 
convicted of criminal copyright infringement. 
B. Does the Supreme Court Endorse the Common Law Vision? 
There is a line between the outright advocacy of common law copy-
right principles and their tacit acceptance, and the Supreme Court has 
generally stayed on the polite side of the line. There are certainly enough 
decisions explaining that the public benefit is the primary purpose of 
copyright. At the same time, in various important instances, the Court 
has accepted some of the more palatable premises underlying common 
law copyright, and this acceptance casts doubt on whether the Justices 
would actually be capable of recognizing an unwarranted departure from 
the traditional contours of copyright. 
It also means that the Court may contribute, albeit unintentionally, 
to the servitude that copyright places on new means of communication. 
This servitude is the result of the inversion of the relationship between 
culture and copyright, and it has been working its way into the law in-
crementally. Among polite statements that tacitly invert the order of cul-
ture and copyright, Paul Goldstein’s paean to the printing press may be 
the most direct: With the invention of the press, “a legal mechanism was 
needed to connect consumers to authors and publishers commercially.”189 
The law threatens to put its imprimatur on the philosophy that flows from 
the Sony Court’s intimation that copyright is the child of technology and 
the friend of progress: “Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of 
copying equipment—the printing press—that gave rise to the original 
need for copyright protection.”190 The statement sounds innocent enough, 
except that it leaves out an inconvenient portion of the historical 
record—censorship and corporate monopoly as the origins of copyright. 
It also tacitly invokes a pseudo-history in which a variety of characters as 
diverse and as fanciful as a dubious Locke, Shakespeare, and the ghost of 
Donaldson v. Beckett seek to persuade us that the basis of copyright is 
natural, and that copyright is essential to the effective dissemination of 
information. 
Given the opportunity, the Justices would undoubtedly disclaim the 
more fanciful premises of common law copyright. Yet, they have sub-
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scribed to at least one of its principal fictions. It may seem harmless or 
even sophisticated to believe with the Sony Court that the advent of the 
printing press made copyright necessary.191 As I have argued, however, 
this belief is at the core of common law copyright theory. The conflict 
between the expansion of copyright and technological advance is not 
incidental. Nor is the strange contrast highlighted in Chalupnik and the 
statutory damages cases coincidental. It is what comes of the law’s des-
perate attempts to create a broad social responsibility for the maintenance 
of the industries’ copyrights, and to force all cultural exchange into the 
hallowed “bundle of sticks” protected as property. 
Despite its Eldred admonition, the Court itself has more than once 
encouraged a departure from copyright tradition by providing a subtle 
endorsement of the common law view while failing to resolve the issue 
actually before it. To the surprise of many, the Grokster Court evaded the 
principal issue presented in the case—in the Court’s own words, “under 
what circumstances the distributor of a product capable of both lawful 
and unlawful use is liable for acts of copyright infringement by third par-
ties using the product”—by asserting that the answer was to be found in 
“rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law.”192 In 
eBay,193 a patent case with implications for copyright and trademark, Jus-
tice Thomas noted a departure from tradition in the issuance of injunctive 
relief in patent cases, but then seemed to dismiss it as a blip running 
counter to a venerable tradition dating back to the nation’s founding.194 
In Bilski, a patent case, Justice Kennedy likewise claimed that the answer 
to the question lay in the Court’s prior jurisprudence, which it did only in 
the most abstract sense195 (which is ironic, given that the Court ruled that 
Bilski’s claimed subject matter was abstract and thus unpatentable). Now 
that Congress has used copyright to remove works from the public do-
main, will the Court be able to judge whether that action represents a 
departure from tradition? 
                                                 
 191. Id. 
 192. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918, 934 (2005). 
 193. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 194. Thus, the majority opinion appears to see a departure in the automatic issuance of injunc-
tions, but one that was sudden, short-lived, and inexplicable—rather than a gradual departure that 
occurred for some reason. For example, Justice Thomas writes, “And as in our decision today, this 
Court has consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule 
that an injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed.” Id. at 
392–93 (emphasis added). 
 195. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
130 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:75 
C. The Difficulty of Transmission and Downloading  
Books for the United States 
Intellectual property law and its attendant social conditions pose in-
creasingly serious challenges to jurists. Although providing real solutions 
lies beyond the scope of this Article, some observations are in order. 
There are at least three related threats in copyright that highlight the dis-
tension that occurs when copyright is placed before culture: the stagger-
ing disproportionality of statutory damages and the harm caused by in-
fringement; the dichotomy between the private benefits enjoyed by the 
copyright industries and the public burdens imposed to support them; and 
the ominous entry of the government into the fray on the side of the in-
dustries. 
A first step toward an appropriate response to these issues necessar-
ily involves an examination of the premises of copyright law, with three 
goals. The first of these goals is to treat the premises as conditions of 
offering copyright protection, standards by which the extent of copyright 
protection may be developed in accord with the goal of copyright law. 
The asserted relationship between copyright and incentives to authorship 
should serve as a requirement imposed on legislation, rather than as an 
axiom that recklessly justifies every extension of the law in the belief 
that more copyright equals more creation. In other words, one important 
question to ask when considering a copyright issue is “what result is 
most consonant with the stated purpose of copyright law?” 
A more fundamental change requires a restatement of the trite as-
sertion of the relationship between copyright and the printing press (and 
its modern stand in, sound-recording technology), an assertion that cle-
verly makes copyright into a timeless right connected with a dated piece 
of machinery. Of course, at one time the printing press made mass dis-
semination much easier than it had ever been in some respects, hence the 
need that sovereigns felt to hobble authors and printers. The importance 
of the press, rather than standing for a fictional proposition on the time-
less origins of copyright, should serve as a reminder that copyright came 
into being at a time when it was difficult to disseminate information. 
This point has certainly been made before, but it has not made its way 
into the law with any certainty, and it helps to take us back to the reasons 
that copyright was enacted in England by the Statute of Anne in 1710, 
and in the United States by a series of state statutes in the 1780s and in 
the Copyright Act of 1790. 
It is a point made by James Madison’s correspondence with Tho-
mas Jefferson regarding Madison’s desperate quest for books in the time 
leading up to the Federal Convention. Given Madison’s character as a 
plagiarist and “pirate”—an infringer who breaks a moral law against co-
2011] The Recording Industry v. James Madison 131 
pying in the absence of a positive law—it should come as no surprise 
that he was also a downloader. Not content to steal from the works of 
Hume, he downloaded other sources for the information that he used in 
inventing the United States. More precisely, people downloaded the in-
formation from the ships that carried the books that Jefferson sent him 
from the bookstalls of Paris. His downloading was somewhat more inno-
cent than his plagiarism; although he was to borrow shamelessly from 
them without authorization, at least he paid for the books, as he had to at 
the time. In the months before the Constitutional Convention, Jefferson 
sent Madison a wide variety of books on history and politics from Par-
is.196 The results of his study included Madison’s famous writings Notes 
of Ancient and Modern Confederacies and Vices of the Political System 
of the United States,197 which historian Douglass Adair describes collec-
tively as “probably the most fruitful piece of scholarly research ever car-
ried out by an American.”198  These studies also led Madison to the con-
troversial and novel conviction that the republic had to be expansive, a 
position that he laid out in his famous speech of June 6, 1787, and later 
made at length in Federalist No. 10. 
Madison wanted the books because he was in the midst of design-
ing a new nation, and his correspondence with Jefferson reminds us how 
hard it was for Americans to get books at the time. This is an image that 
should give us pause: A Founding Father anxiously awaiting the arrival 
of a ship from Paris, desperate to read more about ancient governments 
so as to distill the principles of republican government. 
If European books had been readily available at no charge to Madi-
son by means of technology newer than the printing press, would he have 
waited for old bound books to arrive by ship and then paid large sums for 
them? He was not insouciant when it came to the protection of property 
rights, but if Jefferson had offered to send the requested books imme-
diately and without charge, it is difficult to imagine Madison refusing out 
of respect for a norm against unauthorized copying. The answer that the 
content industries would like to hear is that he would have refused this 
invitation to “piracy,” despite the aid that it would have provided in the 
furtherance of his greatest invention, the United States. Given the protec-
tionist character of copyright and patent at the founding, however, such 
an answer seems unlikely. The very reason that Madison worked so dili-
gently at creating a new republic was that he rejected the version of Brit-
ish law that would have imposed a political monopoly on American co-
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lonists. There is little reason to think that he would have shown much 
respect for a copyright law that hindered his attempt to create an expan-
sive republic impervious to the perils of degeneration. Neither he, nor 
Franklin, nor anyone now famous as a Founder, ultimately deferred to an 
unjust imperial political monopoly justified in the name of the law, and it 
would have been an unlikely thing for them to allow a law protecting 
literary property to impede the progress of the United States. 
Indeed, the chief purpose of the Copyright Act was to produce writ-
ings that would serve America’s interests, and not a more abstract indi-
vidual entitlement. The purpose of copyright was certainly not to privi-
lege outmoded means of communication and to burden innovation, and 
the law today should not be wedded to a view of copyright that does just 
that. In Grokster, the Ninth Circuit offered an assessment, more accurate 
than its counterpart in the Supreme Court’s Sony opinion, of the uneasy 
relationship between the copyright industries and the technological ad-
vances that make it easier to copy and distribute their content: 
From the advent of the player piano, every new means of reproduc-
ing sound has struck a dissonant chord with musical copyright own-
ers, often resulting in federal litigation. This appeal is the latest re-
prise of that recurring conflict, and one of a continuing series of 
lawsuits between the recording industry and distributors of file-
sharing computer software.199 
This is an appropriate view to take of the relationship between copyright 
and technology, a view that considers progress as a condition of copy-
right protection and not as an axiom that justifies the endless extension of 
the law. 
To return to the fanciful problem of the recording industry’s suit 
against Madison and Franklin, which may not be so fanciful after all, 
what would the Supreme Court do if Madison and Franklin were found 
liable by a lower court for copyright infringement? Would it proceed in 
the spirit of copyright at the time of the nation’s founding, animated by 
an ethos that permitted Madison to “plagiarize” freely from the works of 
David Hume, and Franklin to “make available” copies of ostensibly pri-
vate letters deemed to be the literary property of the Governor and Lieu-
tenant Governor of Massachusetts? 
Or would it decide on the basis of an attractive but deceptive vision 
of copyright championed by publishers of literature, music, and movies, 
supported by an eighteenth-century English Solicitor General, a John 
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Locke pressed into the service of a dubious theory, and a Shakespeare 
made to play the critical role of the author in search of copyright law? 
Would the majority or the dissenting opinion begin with the sen-
tence used by Franklin to justify his distribution of the Hutchinson-
Oliver letters, “He stole fire from the sky?” Unfortunately, the answer is 
not clear. 
